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Abstract 
Microfinance institutions (MFIs) are seeing high growth in their industry, but faces challenges 
when it comes to financial viability. The Norwegian savings banks have one of the world’s most 
efficient banking systems and have focused on cost-efficiency over a period of 50 years. We 
examine the possibilities for MFIs being more efficient by learning from Norwegian savings 
banks. We employ a large dataset of 473 MFIs from 77 different countries spanning 15 years, and 
81 Norwegian savings banks spanning 20 years.  
We find that both industries statistically improve their efficiency with time by reducing 
operational expenses in percent of total assets. As the operational expenses decrease with time, we 
additionally test the effect of the MFIs’ age in relation to this decrease. Our panel regressions 
show that the age of an MFI affect neither operational expenses, nor portfolio yield. This result 
provides reasons to believe that age does not affect the operational expenses. Further, we find 
differences in the financial statements and ratios, whereas Norwegian savings banks tend to be 
more stable, while MFIs are converging towards them. Lastly, we find that technology, domestic 
cooperation and alliances are the primary actions contributing to the low cost structure in Norway, 
and that MFIs can learn from this. 
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1 Introduction  
1.1 Background 
The microfinance market is seeing high growth in their industry. Microfinance institutions, MFIs, 
reporting to mixmarket.org have revealed that there has been a growth in both the loan portfolio 
and for individual MFIs. Mersland and Strøm (2012a) reported that, in the period 1999-2009, the 
growth in average loan portfolio has been 41.5% and annual growth for the individual MFIs were 
14.3%. While the microfinance industry is seeing a high growth, there are major concerns in the 
industry about financial viability. Additionally, as the microfinance industry is coming of age, 
came the claim that the industry was abandoning the mission to serve the poor (Ditcher & Harper, 
2007; referenced by Mersland & Strøm, 2010b). Mersland and Strøm (2010b) found that that the 
more cost efficient an MFI was, the smaller the average loan. From this they made a prediction 
that further efforts to reduce costs would result in MFIs reaching out to even poorer segments, 
when profitability was at the same level. This illustrated the importance of achieving higher 
efficiency in microfinance. Moreover, concerning the financial viability, Dieckmann, Speyer, 
Ebling, and Walter (2007) estimated that in 2006 only 1 – 2% of all MFIs in the world were 
financially sustainable, meaning they did not rely on outside subsidies. While, MicroBanking 
Bulletin (autumn 2007) revealed that 41% of microfinance institutions were not financially 
sustainable and were relying on subsidies (Mersland & Strøm, 2010b).  
The interest yield is affected by several determinates whereas the largest are operational expenses. 
In 2011, the yield was on average 26.9% (Rosenberg, Gaul, Ford, & Tomilova, 2013) and as one 
of the main keys to achieve higher efficiency, MFIs must reduce their interest yield (Hug, 2014). 
Microfinance is a labour-intensive business (Mersland & Strøm, 2014), and the possibilities for 
cost reductions are tremendous. The innovations in microfinance have mainly been focusing on 
reducing the risk through new lending methods. Morduch (1999) claimed that we are awaiting a 
new wave of innovations. However, Mersland and Strøm (2012b) said that instead of a new wave, 
the expansion of already implemented and functional innovations were needed.  ResponsAbility 
(2016) interviewed several industry experts saying that technology has the power to change 
microfinance. They further forecasted that branchless banking and mobile money are the trends 
that will transform the industry. Norwegian savings banks had a huge leap in technological 
enhancements starting with the development of electronic payment systems in the beginning of 
the 1960s (Forsbak & Sparebankforeningen, 2004). Today, they possess some of the most 
innovative and efficient online solutions, where development is led by alliances such as the Eika 
group, resulting in shared development costs among the banks. Microfinance needs to look 
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outside their own industry in search of new ways of improving their service in the pursuit of 
sustainability and efficiency. 
1.2 Motivation   
There is little to no previous research on the comparison of microfinance institutions against 
Norwegian savings banks. This was a huge motivational factor when deciding upon this subject. 
Furthermore, the microfinance industry has been under criticism the last decade, which also 
contributed to peak our interest for this subject. After watching the NRK Brennpunkt 
documentary criticising the high interest rate for micro-loans it was evident that the high cost of 
issuing these loans are not beneficial to the borrowers. It will therefore be interesting to compare 
one of the world’s “best” banks against the “worst” to see where microfinance can improve their 
business and services.  
1.3 Objective and Research Problem 
The objective of this thesis has been to research and identify possibilities for microfinance 
institutions to be more efficient by learning from Norwegian savings banks. Firstly, we test 
whether microfinance institutions are becoming more cost-efficient with time. Additionally, we 
run regression analyses to test if age affects the efficiency. Furthermore, we want to illustrate the 
differences between microfinance institutions and Norwegian saving banks. We will do this by 
comparing an excerpt of the financial statements and the trend of some selected accounting ratios. 
Additionally, we hope to show that Norwegian saving banks are becoming more cost efficient, 
even though they already are one of the most cost efficient banks in the world. From this we hope 
to find an indication for what microfinance institutions can focus on in the future, and if some 
features are transferable from Norwegian savings banks to MFIs. This is important because 
microfinance institutions are troubled with financial viability and high costs.  
The objective of the thesis is well suited since microfinance institutions and Norwegian savings 
are both operating in the banking industry. The Nordic banks are one of the most cost-efficient 
banking industries in the world (Little, 2007; Studemann, 2007; The Economist, 2013), and 
getting more efficient, while MFIs are on the opposite scale. As already mentioned, microfinance 
struggles with financial viability and high cost. This gives a good base for identifying and 
researching the possible factors that may be transferred from Norwegian savings banks to MFIs. 
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The research question for this thesis is therefore: 
Can microfinance institutions become more efficient by learning from Norwegian savings 
banks? 
To help answering the research question we have divided it into three sub-questions: 
1. Are MFIs becoming more efficient over time? 
2. How do MFIs compare against Norwegian savings banks? 
3. What have Norwegian savings banks done to become so efficient and can these 
innovations be transferred to MFIs? 
We will start with constructing a graph illustrating the development of the operational expenses of 
the MFIs to test whether they become more efficient with time. We utilize operational expenses as 
they are the largest determinant of the interest yield in microfinance (Rosenberg et al., 2013). To 
be better able to compare the two industries against each other we will use the operational 
expenses in percent of total assets. Afterward, will we conduct a panel regression with age as the 
independent variable to estimate whether the age of an MFI has an effect on the operational 
expenses and portfolio yield. Thereafter, we are going to compare financial figures and ratios for 
both MFIs and Norwegian savings banks to indicate differences between the two industries. In the 
last part of the analysis, we will look at the Norwegian savings banks and the possibilities for 
transferring their focus on cost reduction and technological developments over to the 
microfinance industry. 
1.4 Structure 
This thesis is structured into nine sections. Section two describes the trends in the industries. 
Section three outlines the theory and literature review for microfinance and different aspects on 
the matter and lastly a brief review of developments in Norwegian savings banks. All the theory is 
summarized in section four and concludes the justification of the hypotheses. Thereafter, the data, 
variables, regression and ratios used in the analysis and the methodology discussed, are presented 
in section five and six. Section seven present the analyses and findings, whereas the discussions of 
the findings are found in section eight. The last section is the conclusion where weaknesses and 
the need for future research are identified. 
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2 Industry Trends 
Efficiency is very important for microfinance institutions as mentioned by Mersland and Strøm 
(2010b). They said that efficiency was an element for dealing with the problem of financial 
viability and to uphold the social mission. Additionally, efficiency is the key driver for lower 
interest rates in microfinance (Hug, 2014). Further, Hug (2014) indicated that the achievement of 
higher levels of operating efficiency allows MFIs to charge lower interest rates on a sustainable 
basis.  
Roberto Andrade (Banco Solidario and PUCE, Ecuador) 
“Efficiency will be very important next year. Institutions that manage to reduce 
costs intelligently will do well; others will struggle.” (ResponsAbility, 2016, p. 
25) 
The Microfinance Market Outlook 2016 by ResponsAbility (2016) conducted several interviews 
with microfinance experts, where most said that branchless banking and mobile money is the new 
innovations that will transform the microfinance market. The interviews also reviled that these 
technologies were most prominent for all regions. “Technological advances will boost institutions 
efficiency and outreach capacity, allowing them to provide better services to their clients at lower 
costs” (ResponsAbility, 2016, p. 19). Branchless banking and mobile money were listed before 
broader range of services and credit scoring. Many researchers have argued that credit scoring is 
necessary for the microfinance market (Armendáriz & Morduch, 2010; McIntosh & Wydick, 
2005). However, the market outlook paper by ResponsAbility (2016) found that credit scoring is 
not as important as branchless banking and mobile money, which they considered to be the next 
trends in microfinance. 
This focus on efficiency relates to the DNB1 announcement earlier this year. DNB adjusted their 
branch structure due to the changes in customer behaviour. February 3rd 2016, DNB published a 
press release covering adjustments to the new banking reality. The pace of the digital banking 
revolution is much faster than expected and DNB said that 85% of the Norwegian banking 
customers no longer visit the bank branches for everyday banking. The changes will reduce the 
number of branches from 116 to 57 during the first six months and will further reduce 600 full-
time positions (DNB, 2016). Other Norwegian banks also following the implemented action taken 
by DNB, e.g. Sparebanken Vest, reduced 100 full-time positions by closing nine branches 
(Dagens Næringsliv, 2016a) and Sparebank1 BV reduced 24 full-time positions (Dagens 
Næringsliv, 2016b). 
                                                 
1 DNB = the largest Norwegian savings bank 
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A report from Finance Norway studied the Norwegian people’s banking behaviour, called the 
“daily banking survey”. We have taken two graphs describing Norwegian customers’ behaviour in 
terms of how often they visit local branches and the use of mobile banking. 
 
Figure 1: Local branch visits by Norwegian bank customers from Finance Norway (2016). 
Figure 1 illustrates the development in Norwegian customers’ behaviour in term of how often they 
visit their local bank branches. In 2002, 49% visit their local bank branches once every half a year 
or even less frequently. In 2016 this ratio has increased to 90% and only 10% are visiting their 
local bank branches once every month or more.  
Norway reduced their bank branches with 51 offices in total from 2014 to 2015, and in 2016 
further bank branches are announced to be reduced (Finance Norway, 2016). 
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Figure 2: Usage of Mobil banking by Norwegian bank customers from Finance Norway (2016). 
Norwegian customers are more frequently using their mobile phone for banking. In 2014, 39% of 
the Norwegian population above 15 years were using mobile banking. This ratio has increased to 
almost 50% in 2016. Of those, almost 60% are using mobile banking several times a week, and 
almost 80% at least once a week.  
Norway has one of the world’s most cost-efficient banks in the world (Little, 2007; Studemann, 
2007; The Economist, 2013), but they are striving to be even more efficient. Norwegian consumer 
behaviour changes over the years, but as you can see, Norwegian savings banks quickly adapt to 
the changes in the market. They strive to be even more efficient so they can keep up with the 
competitive market. This is why it is relevant for microfinance to learn from Norwegian savings 
banks. 
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3 Theory and Literature Review 
In this chapter of the thesis, we will present the theoretical framework. It starts with describing 
earlier research on the impact age has on microfinance. To better understand the role of age, we 
also include earlier research on the market development phases and cost drivers. Cost drivers 
include economies of scale, experience, learning and technology, and are all relevant to a firm’s 
growth. Next we present earlier research and theory on what determines the interest rate, 
competition and efficiency. All theories are used in the thesis analysis and discussion when 
comparing the industries. Lastly, we outline developments done by the Norwegian banks, and the 
innovations in the microfinance industry. This is to better understand the developments in Norway 
that have created such a cost-efficient banking industry and are used when discussing what may 
be transferable to microfinance institutions. 
3.1 Age 
Previous research on the age of microfinance is relevant to this thesis, since it is related to 
research question one, and our hypotheses about how age and time affect operational expenses 
and efficiency, which can be seen in section 4.  
Standard economic theory give us the expectations that, in young industries, costs will improve as 
firms or the industry grows and acquires more experience. When the efficiency lessons have been 
learned, the learning curve will flatten out. After this point, the efficiency improvements will 
increase slowly, if at all in the absence of technological improvements (Rosenberg et al., 2013). 
Caudill, Gropper, and Hartarska (2009) stated that the general expectations that a firm should 
improve with time, ceteris paribus, were both an understatement and an oversimplification for 
MFIs. González Vega (1998) referenced by Caudill et al. (2009, pp. 652-653) mentioned benefits 
with the passage of time:  
1. The lending technology is proven and improved through several years of experimentation, 
development, and adjustment 
2. The MFI accumulates a stock of information capital about the clientele and the 
environment  
3. The MFI develops client relationships and identifies well-performing clients 
4. The MFI accumulates the human capital embodied in an experienced staff 
5. The MFI acquires a reputation as a serious organization capable of sustaining 
relationships with clients 
6. The MFI has likely established connections with international networks and enjoys the 
resulting technology transfers.  
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Then Caudill et al. (2009, p. 653) mentioned possible reasons for why costs may flatten or even 
increase with time: 
1. Screening and monitoring costs may rise as MFIs reach beyond their initial target group 
2. Operational expenses may increase if MFIs move into more isolated and rural markets 
3. Operational expenses could rise if MFIs begin competing in increasingly saturated 
markets 
4. Higher collection costs may be associated with a possible culture of non-repayment and 
may be experienced if the MFI has to address increasing default rates 
5. Village banking methods may simply replicate costs as they are extended into new areas.  
The research of Caudill et al. (2009) indicated that MFIs generally operate more cost efficient 
over time. In the Eastern Europe and Central Asia region, half the MFIs became more cost 
efficient, while the other half did not. The Eastern Europe and Central Asia are somewhat 
different from Microfinance institutions elsewhere in the world, as they are among the youngest in 
the microfinance industry and their performance ranks among the best (Berryman, 2004; 
referrenced by Caudill et al., 2009). The group that is becoming more cost efficient with time is 
relying less on subsidies and more heavily on deposits as a source of loanable funds. The 
microfinance institutions that were not in a network also tended to improve. Additionally, MFI 
located in Central Asia were more likely to improve than those in Eastern Europe. 
Rosenberg, Gonzalez, and Narain (2009) found that age of a microfinance institution is strongly 
associated with lower operational expenses, even after separating out the effects of loan size, scale 
and other relevant variables, although the effect weakened over time. Operational expenses in 
percent of loan portfolio tended to drop by 2–8 percentage points for each of the first six years, 
then 1–2 percentage points for each of the next five years, and less than 1 percentage point for 
each year thereafter. 
3.2 Market Development Phases  
Mersland and Strøm (2012b) stated that the development of microfinance had the traits of an 
industry in its take-off phase. This is a phase with strong, persistence growth over several years.  
Porteous (2006) described the effects of competition in four different market development phases, 
which can relate to the statement made by Mersland and Strøm (2012b). 
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Table 1: Competition through Market Development Phases (Porteous, 2006). 
Porteous (2006, p. 3) simplified description “highlights the fact that competition is present 
throughout a firm’s existence. The competitive behaviour of firms change in response to 
customer’s needs and other firms’ actions” 
Starting with the first phase, the pioneer phase. This is when a small number of providers with 
limited reach introduce a product in a market. In this phase, the growth might be slow and there 
will be little competition.  
If the earlier pioneers have visible success, other firms will quickly enter the market and the 
market moves into the second phase. The second phase is the “take-off” phase, which indicated by 
Mersland and Strøm (2012b) was where the microfinance industry belongs. As the volume and 
visibility of products grow, firms primarily compete for improvement of the product to better suit 
customers and by enhancing service levels.  
The market, as a whole, starts to show saturation at the current price level as a result of the rapid 
growth in the second phase. Growth may decline and the market enters the third phase, 
consolidation. Competition in this phase is in the pricing area, to allow new customers to 
participate. By the time firms reach this point, they have grown in scale and lowered their costs, 
which create profits that are allowing them to reduce costs. Firms that are not able to develop low 
cost structures may be forced out of the market. The competitive strategy changes from being 
supply driven to becoming demand driven, where firms are forced to respond to clients’ needs.  
After firms with unsustainable, high cost structures are forced out of the market, a mature market 
emerges. The mature market has a stable numbers of firms and grows only as fast as external 
variables such as demographics, allows. The competition generally focuses on brand; customer 
1. Pioneer 2. Take-off 3. Consolidation 4. Mature
Growth in 
volume 
May be slow Rapid Positive but slowing steady natural growth
Number of firms One or a few Increases rapidly Reduces from peak 
because of 
consolidation
Depends on 
characteristics of the 
product and market
Market structure Concentrated Fragmented, although 
market leader emerges
Concentrating; clear 
market leaders 
emerges
Maker leaders 
dominate
Arenas of 
competition 
Little competition 
except as to location 
of distribution points
product characteristics 
and service levels
Price Brand (including 
pricing)
Market 
Characteristics
Market phases
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experience with service, price, place and product. Average prices may drop even further if greater 
efficiencies are achieved through economies of scale. 
The mature phase is generally not the end of the story for most markets. Technological and 
business model innovations may disrupt current market structure by introducing new competitive 
behaviour, causing the cycle to repeat. 
3.3 Cost Drivers 
Traditionally, production volume was the primary variable for cost behaviour. During the 1980s 
new variables that could drive costs were developed. Nowadays, it is recognized that costs are 
driven by many different factors (Banker & Johnston, 2006). The following presents an excerpt of 
Michael Porter (Porter, 1985) and Riley’s (Shank, 1989) cost drivers we believe to be important 
when trying to understand cost drivers for microfinance.  
Cost drivers analysis allows the firm to understand the cause and effect relationship for the cost 
behaviour. Porter (1985) believed that cost drivers could more or less be under a firm's control, 
and it was thereby important to take conscious strategic choices related to the cost drivers for the 
firm. 
Economies or diseconomies of scale 
Porter and Riley both mentioned economies/diseconomies of scale in their cost drivers. Size is a 
structural factor that can have impact on costs. With large production volumes economies of scale 
can arise when activities are performed more efficiently and the cost are under-proportioned to the 
volume. Size may also involve diseconomies of scale with complexity and increasing 
coordination costs, when an increasing number of departments and employees have to 
communicate and interact. 
In general, one would believe if an MFI could allocate the fixed operational expenses from 
lending activities per a million borrowers, that this would lower the cost per loan. Smaller loans 
have higher administrative costs than larger loans, but are expected to decrease due to economies 
of scale, as microfinance institutions grow larger. Moreover, they would then be able to lower the 
interest yield more than an MFI with only a few thousand clients (Rosenberg et al., 2009). The 
regression analysis from Rosenberg et al. (2009) indicated that MFIs capture most of the benefits 
from economies of scale by the time they reached around 2,000 clients, meaning that after an 
early point in their development they gained relatively little from economies of scale. The results 
from Hartarska, Shen, and Mersland (2013) also indicated that microfinance gained little from 
economies of scale. They found that serving more clients was more expensive than serving larger 
clients. This is probably due to the fact that microfinance institutions have lower fixed costs and 
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higher variable costs. Operational expenses are very large in microfinance institutions, where the 
majority of the costs come from labour costs. In short, the benefits of economies of scale do not 
compensate for the added expense that comes from making very small micro-credit loans. 
Learning and experience 
Porter (1985) mentioned learning as a cost driver, while Riley referenced by  Shank (1989) 
mentioned experience. Porter (1985) said that there were numerous ways that learning could 
lower cost over time. Some examples may be more efficient activities, labour efficiency 
improvement and procedures that increase the utilization of assets. The impact experience has on 
costs can be influenced by the number of times a firm repeats its’ processes and learn from this 
each time. 
Rosenberg et al. (2009) often referred to the learning curve, which is that an MFIs could achieve 
greater outcome when operations were performed several times. Microfinance institutions learn 
by doing. “As institutions mature, they learn their business better and are able to  control costs 
more effectively” (Rosenberg et al., 2009, p. 14). MFIs operational expenses have dropped in 
recent years and this represents operating improvements, not just an increase in loan sizes. The 
regression performed by Rosenberg et al. (2009) suggested that much of these improvements 
reflected the learning curve as MFIs gained experience. 
Caudill et al. (2009) also stated that learning by doing is particularly important for MFIs because 
it is about fundamental innovation in lending practices and the development of new lending 
methods largely through trial and error. The risk exposure in microfinance can also be best 
handled through experience, as managers and loan officers learn about their borrowers and the 
lending technologies most effective to serve them. 
Technology 
Technology is used in the various stages of the firm's value chain and could affect costs. Choosing 
to be a leader or a follower in the industry regards to technological solutions can therefore be a 
strategic decision of importance.  
The new banking technology such as ATMs, the use of cell phones and the Internet has begun to 
enter the microfinance industry. This has helped microfinance institutions to improve their 
sustainability and efficiency. These developments have helped to reduce costs and improve the 
delivery of service (Kapoor, Morduch, & Ravi, 2007; Rhyne & Otero, 2006), referenced by 
(Hermes, Lensink, & Meesters, 2011) 
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Figure 3: Transaction costs for U.S. Banks from Ivatury, Pickens, and Siedek (2006). 
Microfinance institutions such as Banco Ademi in the Dominican Republic and ProCredit bank in 
Kosovo typically place ATMs in or near branches. The customers can perform routine deposit, 
withdrawal, and balance inquiry transactions at a far lower cost for the banks than the cost of 
having a teller. A result of this is freeing staff to sell products or give customers personalized 
attentions. ATMs also save costumers from having to wait in line to get to a teller (Ivatury et al., 
2006). 
A general trend is that banks worldwide are trying to move customers towards low-cost 
technological delivery channels. ICICI Bank in India reduced the numbers of transactions at 
branches from 78% of all transactions to 35%. The remaining 65% were processed online, at 
ATMs or over the phone (Ivatury et al., 2006). 
3.4 Interest Rate 
Microfinance institutions nominal interest yield was on average about 27% in 2011, where it has 
declined since 2004 when the interest yield was 30%. The interest yield declined in the period 
2004 – 2007, but not in the period 2007 – 2011 (Rosenberg et al., 2013). Rosenberg et al. (2013) 
broke the interest yield for microfinance into four main determinants, which are: operational 
expense, financial expense, loan losses and profit.  
Operational expense includes the cost of implementing the loan activities, personnel 
compensation, suppliers, travel, and depreciation of fixed assets. This component is the largest 
determinant of the interest yield. There has been a decline in average operating expense, but the 
decline has slowed recently. Rosenberg et al. (2013) said that it remained to see if this level of 
operating expenses would follow further declines, or whether this represented the bottom line of 
the learning curve effect. 
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Financial expense mainly refers to the cost of funding. Micro-lenders fund their loans with a 
combination of equity and debt. Cost of funding has increased substantially over the years. Micro-
lenders have funded more of their portfolio from commercial borrowing. Funding costs have 
increased the most for micro-lenders serving the low-end clientele. 
Loans from micro-banks are generally with very little or without any collateral and with no 
financial history from the client. Therefore, there is a high risk for micro-lenders due to late 
payments or defaults. On global bases, the loans losses have been fairly steady, but India and 
Mexico are two large markets, which have seen a large rises in bad loans in recent years.  
Profits are the difference between income and expense. Profits have dropped from about one-fifth 
in 2004 to less than one-tenth in 2011.  
 
Figure 4: Drivers for interest yield from Rosenberg et al. (2013). 
3.5 Competition 
Earlier research on competition in microfinance is relevant for this thesis, since in general, 
economists agree upon the fact that competition typically results in reduced costs and lower prices 
for consumers. Moreover, it may also encourage the development of new products and efficient 
technologies (Assefa, Hermes, & Meesters, 2013). 
Competition in the microfinance industry has increased rapidly in several countries (Assefa et al., 
2013). One source of this increased competition can be the high growth rates in the recent years. 
In the period 2000 – 2005, average annual growth rates in terms of number of clients served by 
MFIs amounted to 50%, while during 2006 – 2008 70 – 100% per year in some markets (Sinha, 
2010). Other sources of growth in competition are that commercial banks have become interested 
in entering the microfinance industry. 
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 “In 1998, CGAP described commercial banks as “new actors in the microfinance world.” And 
seven years later commercial banks are playing an increasingly more important role in many 
financial services markets across the world “ (Isern & Porteous, 2005, p. 1). Commercial banks 
have started to become interested in entering the microfinance industry, since in the past MFIs 
have shown that this can be a profitable business (Hermes, Lensink, & Meesters, 2009). It also 
allows the commercial banks to show their corporate social responsibility. When a commercial 
bank has become involved in microfinance, it is then referred to as downscaling.  
Rhyne and Otero (2006) illustrated the positive effects with an example from Bolivia. 
Microfinance in Bolivia is under competition, whereas the interest rates on microfinance loans 
have changed from 29% in 1998 to 21% in 2004.  
Armendáriz and Morduch (2010) stated problems emerged due competition, especially in the two 
countries where microfinance was first established, Bangladesh and Bolivia. McIntosh and 
Wydick (2005) also reported problems with competition in Uganda, Kenya, Guatemala, El 
Salvador and Nicaragua. The problem with competition in Bolivia and other places was that 
borrowers were taking multiple loans simultaneously from different lenders (Armendáriz & 
Morduch, 2010). This resulted in borrowers becoming over-indebted, paying one loan by taking 
new loans from other lenders, which created a spiral of debt. In Bangladesh the problem has been 
called “overlapping” and Armendáriz and Morduch (2010) reported that there were more than one 
micro-lender operating in 95% of 80 villages surveyed by researchers at the Bangladesh Institute 
of Development. They had estimates that 15% of all borrowers took loans from more than one 
institution.  
Grameen bank’s repayments rate went from above 98% to below 90% and dropping repayment 
rates have happened several places (Hermes et al., 2009; McIntosh, Janvry, & Sadoulet, 2005; 
Vogelgesang, 2003). “The lesson from these experiences is not that monopolies should be 
protected. In both Bangladesh and Bolivia, competition has brought a healthy round of general 
rethinking that would have not otherwise happened so soon” (Armendáriz & Morduch, 2010, p. 
128). 
3.6 Efficiency 
Previous research on the efficiency of microfinance is relevant to this thesis, since it is related to 
competition and costs, where Norwegian savings banks are amongst the most efficient. There has 
been an increased focus on financial sustainability and efficiency in microfinance due to a number 
of developments. Such as increased competition, commercialization of microfinance, 
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technological changes, financial liberalization and policies of the government (Hermes et al., 
2011). 
Hermes et al. (2009) conducted research on whether efficiency is related to the level of financial 
development in a country. They found strong supportive evidence for the hypothesis that there is a 
positive relationship between MFI efficiency and domestic financial development. Thus, more 
developed financial systems create more efficient MFIs.  
The research from Assefa et al. (2013) on “Competition and performance of microfinance 
institutions” found that declining efficiency and weakened financial performance is shown to be 
associated with intense competition 
3.7 Innovation 
Innovation might be perceived to be a new phenomenon, since the study of innovation did not 
emerge into a separate field of study before the 1960s. We can see through history that innovation 
has spanned through our lifetime. From the invention and application of fire, the wheel and the 
alphabet to the commercializing of the car, innovation has existed for a long time. It is in our 
humanity to think of better and new ways to do things and try them out (Fagerberg, 2004). 
Schumpeter’s work has greatly influenced the innovation theory and his argument is that 
innovation drive the economic development by replacing old technologies with new, which he 
called “creative destruction” (OECD & Eurostat., 2005). 
Microfinance in itself is an innovation as it created new markets and targeted customer that other 
banks had not bothered reaching. Jonathan Morduch stated that “the promise of microfinance was 
founded on innovation: new management structure, new contracts, and new attitude” (Morduch, 
1999, p. 1572). A microfinance institution sets out to bank the unbankable and this contributes to 
the creation of new markets and customer. 
3.7.1 The Targeting of Poor People 
If we look to the lending to poor people, this is one of the micro-bank’s missions. However, when 
we look at this from a business perspective it becomes a way to discover and gain new markets 
(Mersland & Strøm, 2012b). The practice of lending money and offering savings possibilities are 
not a new invention in itself, banks have been issuing loans for a long time. An innovation can be 
a new way of applying an invention and microfinance takes the already established banking 
system and utilize the processes in a new market with new customers, and therefore it is an 
innovation rather than an invention (Schumpeter, 1934). 
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Before micro-banks were established, local moneylenders served the poorest clients. These 
lenders knew the local customers and therefore gave loans to those they knew were able to repay, 
in other words selecting the low-risk borrowers. The local moneylenders did, however, not have 
the knowledge needed to risk assess the lenders outside their area and did not have the possibility 
to use sanctions against borrowers not repaying their loans. Moreover, this precluded the lenders 
from obtaining economies of scale (Mersland & Strøm, 2012b). The asymmetric information that 
arises in a scenario like this is a prime example on how the information asymmetry prevents the 
establishment of new markets (Akerlof, 1970). What the micro-banks did was that they filled this 
gap to create a market where the poor could get loans and banking services. 
3.7.2 Targeting Women  
Before micro-banking there was little interest in the banking of women (Lemire, 2002), one 
exception being eighteenth-century Irish funds consisted of one-quarter female clients. This was 
possibly due to the small loan amounts (Hollis, 1999). Mayoux (1999) stated that there were three 
main factors that favour the lending to women.  
Firstly, lending to women will affect the efficiency of the micro-bank. There are many studies that 
document that women have a better repayment rate than men (D'Espallier, Guérin, & Mersland, 
2013). This indicates that with a higher percentage of female borrowers the repayment rates will 
be higher.  
Secondly, lending to women has a poverty reduction effect, since women invest their income to 
improve the well-being of their families. 
Lastly, by giving loans to women they are able to enhance the income they contribute to the 
household and this can give them better bargaining power in the household (Mersland & Strøm, 
2012b). 
3.7.3 New Lending Technologies  
Group Lending 
One key innovation that helped the Grameen bank expand internationally was group lending. By 
being able to lend to groups in villages they started to expand village by village, which 
contributed to their explosive growth. Due to the target customer for microfinance institutions 
usually do not have enough assets to use as collateral, the industry had to find alternative ways to 
ensure their payments.  
When The Grameen Bank first started to lend money to the villagers in Jobra in Bangladesh, they 
did this, using individual loans. Later, it was the motivation of obtaining economies of scale that 
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led them to starting utilizing group loans. The process in which Grameen Bank lent money were 
for a group of five only two would get a loan. If these two repaid all the instalments in time 
another loan to two other group members would be issued. Lastly, if these two repaid their loan 
the last member would be granted a loan by the bank. This is referred to as sequential financing 
(Armendáriz & Morduch, 2010). If all loans were repaid the group would usually be offered a 
larger loan in the next loan cycle, also referred to as contingent renewal. Armendáriz and 
Morduch (2010) further explained how lending to groups helped with the adverse selection 
problem. The banks have little or no information about the creditworthiness of the borrowers and 
the risk of defaults is therefore high. This can lead to a decline in loans to safe borrowers as well. 
If banks have little knowledge about the borrower, the group can be a great way to select members 
that present a low risk when it comes to not being able to pay their instalments. Ghatak (2000) 
made a compelling argument that when it came to joint liability, people would choose group 
members that are similar to oneself whether they are risky or safe borrowers. It all came down to 
one owns success. If we, for instance, look at the scenario where one's project will succeed, there 
will be no extra benefit from having a safe or a risky partner. If we do not know the outcome of 
the project a safe borrower will increase the possibility of success by grouping up with other safe 
borrowers. Armendáriz and Morduch (2010) said the same as Ghatak (2000) which was that risky 
would pair with risky and safe with safe. The risky borrower cannot afford to compensate the safe 
borrower enough for them to agree on a partnership. This means that the loss a safe borrower will 
have from pairing with a risky borrower is larger than the risky borrower will profit from pairing 
with a safe borrower. 
3.8 Developments in Norwegian Banks 
Norwegian banking customers have access to one of the world’s most efficient systems for 
payment services. Norway has a more coordinated payment system than nearly any other country 
(Forsbak & Sparebankforeningen, 2004). 
Since the start of 1960 and until today, the savings banks have led the development of today’s 
electronic payment system. Until the mid-70s cash and personal checks were the predominant 
payment method. The savings banks started to deploy their first ATMs in the autumn of 1977 and 
by 1981 – 82 the savings banks had 200 ATMs in operation and 200,000 active savings 
customers, while the commercial banks had only just started their instalments of their ATMs. The 
public adapted quickly to these new payment services. By 1986, the number of savings banks’ 
ATMs had rose to 550, which were two thirds of all ATMs in Norway at that point. To illustrate 
the quick adaption by the public, by 1985 there was one withdraw from ATMs for every fifth 
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check, and two years later this ratio was one withdraw from ATMs for every second check 
(Forsbak & Sparebankforeningen, 2004). 
Norges Bank2 is obligated by law to promote an efficient payment system in Norway and from 
Norway to other countries. Norwegian payment systems had their best progress in the decade of 
the 1990s in terms of technological solutions, cooperation between participants and services to the 
public (Haare & Solheim, 2012). In 1991 there were five different kinds of Eftpos3 systems with 
different technologies, which created high fixed costs and counteracted development. At the end 
of 1991 a joint Eftpos company were created, BankAxept, which is a card solution system for 
payments. This new system was in full operation in 1995 after finally all payment terminals were 
deployed (Haare & Solheim, 2012). 
From 1990s there was a large increase in the usage of electronic payments. To illustrate the 
changes, there were in 1984 issued 100 million personal checks, while only 1.5 million in 2003. 
Further, the value of electronic payments in 1994 was 100 million while in 2003, 550 million. The 
public changed their payment method and the circulation of cash started to decrease after 1999. 
Therefore, Norway have also decrease the number of ATMs (Forsbak & Sparebankforeningen, 
2004). 
Norges Bank launched a project to develop a more robust and efficient clearing and settlement 
system and by November 1999, Norges Bank has had a fully functional real-time settlement 
system. One feature was the development of a new system for online coverage control of the 
banks’ accounts in Norges Bank (Haare & Solheim, 2012). 
Internet banking was launched in 1996, but it was only after 2000 that people really began to use 
the solution. In 1998, the number of electronic giro transactions was approximately the same as 
paper-based giro transactions. Growth in the electronic solutions and the use of Internet as a 
channel for payment resulted in paper-based payments only utilized 5% all giro payments in 2010. 
The transition to electronic payment services has resulted in significant increase in banks' 
productivity in the payment area (Haare & Solheim, 2012). 
  
                                                 
2 Norges Bank is an executive and advisory, state owned, body for monetary, credit and foreign exchange policy. 
3 Electronic funds transfer at point of sale 
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4 Hypotheses Development 
The theory and literature review on what impact age has on microfinance are mainly stating that 
age does affect operational expenses. To get a better understanding of the role of age, we include 
theory and literature review on market development phases and cost drivers. Mersland and Strøm 
(2012b) suggested that microfinance is in its take-off phase. This phase involves a high growth in 
the market, with competition focusing on improvement in the product and enhancing service 
levels. Rosenberg et al. (2009) found that the age of microfinance is strongly associated with 
lower costs. This is in line with standard economic theory that gives us the expectation that, in 
young industries, costs will improve as the industry grows and acquires more experience. 
Furthermore, Rosenberg et al. (2009) suggested that the recent drop in operational expenses 
reflects the learning curve. Caudill et al. (2009) stated that the general expectations that a firm 
should improve with time, ceteris paribus, are both an understatement and an oversimplification 
for MFIs. Furthermore, they described reasons for why costs should decrease or increase over 
time, as see section 3.1. While, both Rosenberg et al. (2009) and Hartarska et al. (2013) found that 
there exists little benefits for economies of scale in the microfinance industry. Moreover, Hermes 
et al. (2011) stated that the new banking technology, such as ATMs, the use of cell phones and the 
Internet has begun entering the market, and that this has helped reduce costs and improve the 
delivery of service. These theories and literature review are the basis of our first hypothesis: 
H1 Microfinance institutions achieve greater cost-efficiency over time 
H2 Age of an MFI has an effect on operational expenses  
Furthermore, we outline theory and literature review on competition, efficiency and the interest 
rate. We look at these together with the market development phases and predict that Norwegian 
savings banks’ development phase differs from MFIs’. Competition in microfinance has not the 
same effect that it has in Norway, which we believe to be a reason of the MFIs’ current phase. 
Additionally, there are differences between the country’s financial developments. Hermes et al. 
(2009) found strong evidence that efficiency is related to the level of the country’s financial 
development. Our next hypothesis is therefore:  
H3 Norwegian savings banks’ financial performance differs from microfinance 
institutions’ 
Lastly, we outline what innovations that has been done in the microfinance industry and what 
development that has happened in Norway. The technology, alliances and the domestic 
cooperation in the Norwegian banking industry leading us to our last hypothesis: 
H4 Microfinance can learn from Norwegian savings banks 
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5 Data 
5.1 Microfinance Institutions 
The microfinance dataset for this thesis is based on the observation of 473 rated MFIs in 77 
different countries. For a list of all countries in the MFI dataset see appendix A1. The 
establishment of the standardized ratings have been conducted by third-party organizations and 
parts of the costs has been subsidized by outside organizations. To get MFIs to submit data they 
receive more access to external funding if they submit to the rating. Data that are collected from 
e.g. the Mixmarket database are so called self-collected data. The standardized MFI data from the 
third-party rating agencies are considered to be better than these and also includes both outreach 
and financial data (Mersland & Strøm, 2009). This makes the “Mersland dataset” ideal for 
measuring cost efficiency, sustainability and profitability. The agencies normally collect four 
years of data at every rating, but some MFIs report five, six or even more years of data at each 
rating. Due to the method in which the data are collected the dataset is a panel dataset and since 
not all banks report all years the dataset is an unbalanced dataset. We have data from 1998 to 
2012 with more than 100 observations per year from 2001 to 2009. Due the small number of 
observations, year 1998 and 2012 are both eliminated. The decision was made on the basis that 
there were fewer than 20 observations for these two years.  
To alleviate problems associated with country-specifics that arise when comparing companies 
from different countries, several measures have been taken to counter these. Firstly, all monetary 
values have been converted in to USD, since the exchange rate reflects the countries inflation rate. 
We also use a country specific variable, GDP per Capita, in the regression (Mersland & Strøm, 
2010b). In section 5.3 we explain why GDP per Capita was elected. We also use a fixed effects 
model since it removes time invariant and idiosyncratic differences from the data (Wooldridge, 
2010). The bases for this decision will be explained when the results for the regressions are 
presented in section 7.2 
5.2 Norwegian Savings Banks 
The dataset for Norwegian savings banks used in this thesis are all public data collected from 
Finance Norway online (fno.no/en). The data are from 1995 to 2014 and include (i) Profit and loss 
accounts in NOK thousand for the parent bank, (ii) Balance sheets in NOK thousand for the 
parent bank, (iii) Profit and loss accounts in per cent of average total assets for the parent bank, 
(iv) Balance sheets in per cent of total assets for the parent bank, (v) Key figures for the parent 
bank, (vi) Risk per PCC/Share, (vii) Key figures on Equity Certificates. We will utilize i-iv for 
our calculations and analysis.  
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Not all banks are represented in all years and we have therefore eliminated these from the dataset. 
During the period of our dataset we have several banks that merge. To make our sample as equal 
as possible we eliminate all merging banks and keep those who are represented the entire time 
period. This includes the banks that change names, but did not merge with any other banks. E.g. 
Nøtterø sparebank changed name to Sparebank 1 Nøtterøy-Tønsberg in 2010 and had no 
overlapping accounting numbers and hence will not be eliminated from our dataset. We have 
several banks that changed names during the period so these banks will not be eliminate from our 
dataset, as they are in the same category as Nøtterø sparebank. The largest banks are also omitted 
from the dataset. These are banks that report financial revenues and total assets at a substantially 
higher level than the other banks throughout the entire period. After these eliminations we are left 
with 81 banks that are represented in all years, which gives us a total of 1,620 observations with 
81 observations each year. 
To make the figures comparable to the figures in the MFI dataset we convert the numbers for 
Norwegian savings banks from NOK to USD.  
5.3 Regression Analysis 
As a part of this paper we want to find out whether the age of an MFI has an effect on operational 
expenses and portfolio yield. We therefore intend to run two regression analyses with operational 
expenses and portfolio yield as the dependent variable and age as the independent variables using 
several control variables. For operational expenses, we use the absolute value for the MFIs as the 
dependent variable. The same goes for the portfolio yield. Then we utilized total assets as a 
measure of size together with average loan, personnel productivity, GDP per capita and two 
dummy variables for loan methodology as the control variables.  
We decided to use operational expenses in percent of total assets as the dependent variable and 
exclude total assets from this regression. The new dependent variable was more suited to pick up 
the size of the banks and also better captured the growth of the MFIs. Total assets will still be 
included in the regression for portfolio yield. 
As mentioned earlier in this section we want to test whether the age of an MFI affects the 
operational expenses and portfolio yield. Age is then our independent variable and we want to see 
how the cause-and-effect relationship is between the dependent variable and independent variable. 
For age we used the year in which an MFI began with microfinance activities. We then subtracted 
this from the year in which a particular observation was reported giving us the age of the MFI for 
that particular year. 
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Average loan has an effect on operational expenses. The lower the loan the higher the cost per 
loan will be. When issuing a loan there will always be fixed costs that will, for smaller loans, be 
distributed over a lower loan amount increasing the total cost for that particular loan (Mersland & 
Strøm, 2010b). This is the reason we included this as one of the control variables. We will 
therefore expect this variable to be significant and have a negative, decreasing, effect on the 
operating expenses. 
The productivity of the employees is defined by how many credit customers they are responsible 
for. When having a cost saving perspective the more customers per employee the better. The cost 
of one employee will be lower per customer if that employee can handle more customers. This is 
why we utilize this as one of our control variables. We are then to believe that this variable will 
have a negative, decreasing, effect on the operational expenses, since the higher the customer 
count per employee the more cost efficient the bank becomes.  
Moreover, we need to include a country specific variable since the country in which a bank is 
operating has an effect on the performance (Mersland & Strøm, 2010b). GDP being a measure of 
economic size for a country and on the bases of the research of Hartarska (2005) we elected to use 
GDP per capita as a country specific variable. As this is a measure of economic size for a country, 
we presume this variable to reduce the operational expenses.  
To control for the size of the MFIs we include a size variable that is the natural logarithm of total 
assets. This is a way of transforming a skewed variable in to a more normally distributed variable 
(Benoit, 2011). If you look to appendix A2, this particular variable is presented through two 
histograms, one to illustrate the skewness of the total assets and then how the utilization of the 
natural logarithm transforms the variable to be almost normally distributed. We believe this 
variable will have a negative effect on the operational expenses.  
Lastly, we need to control for the loan methodology. Armendáriz and Morduch (2010) stated that 
the loan method has an effect on the costs and is therefore included in the regression as two 
dummy variables. The MFIs in our dataset have four methods of lending, village loans, solidarity 
groups, individual loans and others. Therefore, we create dummies for village loans, solidarity 
groups and individual loans and due to the few observations with other loan methods we eliminate 
the MFIs that are classified as utilizing this methodology. We then sat up a dummy for each of the 
remaining methodologies. For the village loan dummy we gave the MFIs issuing village loans the 
value 1 and 0 for the MFIs utilizing a different methodology. We then did this for the other two 
loan methods. Furthermore, we ran a correlation analysis to see the correlation between these 
dummies and eliminated the one with the highest correlation, being individual loans, ending up 
with a dummy for village loan and solidarity group loans. This means that our base group is 
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individual loans since this dummy is omitted from the regression. When analysing the results of 
the regression, our dummies will measure the proportionate difference in relation to issuing 
individual loans (Wooldridge, 2013). Mersland and Strøm (2010a) demonstrated in their paper 
that the cost of maintaining group loans excided the benefits of these loan methods. Armendáriz 
and Morduch (2010) stated that group loans were a way of achieving efficient outcomes. This 
leads us to believe that our predictions for these variables are ambiguous and we are not able to 
predict the effect of these dummies. Therefore, it will be interesting seeing which of these theories 
our regression will support. 
 
Table 2: Overview of the regression variables with descriptive analysis.  
5.4 Accounting Ratios and Financial Ratios  
Norwegian savings banks and microfinance institutions are on opposite sides of the scale. It will 
therefore be interesting to investigate differences in the financial statements. We have based our 
descriptive analysis on Mersland and Strøm (2014) article on “measuring microfinance” and taken 
the same accounting figures and ratios. They use main accounting figures for the average MFI and 
with those accounting figures they measure the most commonly used ratios. The ratios used are 
ROA, Profit Margin, and OSS, which measure sustainability and profitability. Additionally, we 
added cost income ratio, operational expenses and net financial revenue. After looking at the 
financial statement for Norwegian savings banks, it seems that these ratios are highly used and 
measures efficiency in banks. These accounting ratios are used in order to show how banks are 
performing in relation to each other.  
5.4.1 Return on Assets (ROA) 
The most common measure of profitability is the return on assets for banks and other commercial 
institutions (Rosenberg et al., 2009). Defined as:  
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 =  
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
Net income is calculated by taking all revenues and deducts all expenses of doing business, 
interest, taxes and other expenses. Total assets are calculated as the average total assets, which 
imply that the total assets at the beginning of the year and the end of the year are added together 
Variable Definition Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max Hyp.
Operational Expenses Operating expenses divided by the average total assets 1,883 0.2124982 0.1704908 0.1544158 0.0013426 1.7123
Portfolio Yield The portfolio yield at the end of the year in $million 2,169 0.3790763 0.341 0.1873622 0.007 1.825
Age Years of experience as a MFI 2,197 11.38598 10 7.330436 1 80 -
Size The natural logarithm of total assets 2,255 15.14508 15.14759 1.498816 9.867238 19.44798 -
Average Loan Average loan size in $million 1,311 1747.072 731 17394.65 15 623874 -
Personnel Productivity Number of credit clients per employee 2,082 132.9165 111 110.0143 1 1893 -
GDP per Capita GDPPC in the end of the period in $million 2,162 2304.995 1547.267 2256.599 111.5312 13392.92 -
Village Loan 1 if the MFI issues village loans 2,071 0.1921777 0 0.3941071 0 1 +/-
Solidarity Group 1 if the MFI issues solidarity group loans 2,071 0.2554322 0 0.4362092 0 1 +/-
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and divided by two. However, the microfinance dataset do not have any records for taxes before 
2003, but the ROA is already calculated and given to us from the dataset. To see whether the 
calculation methodology selected applies to these given ROAs, calculations for the years where 
the necessary numbers are available were conducted. The similarity of the given ROA and the 
calculations give reason to perceive them as reliable and are therefore used in the analysis for 
MFIs. For the Norwegian savings banks, the calculation methodology presented will be used. 
The return on assets shows how the MFI is performing relative to its assets (Ledgerwood, 2014). 
A high return indicates high returns for the lending activities. 
Mersland and Strøm (2014) pointed out that a return should cover the risk-free rate together with a 
markup covering the systematic risk of the MFI. Since few of the MFIs are listed, such a risk-
adjusted return is hard to calculate. However, calculations of this nature will be beyond the 
purpose of this thesis. 
5.4.2 Net Operational Income in Percent of Revenues (Operational Profit Margin) 
Net operational income in percent of revenues is defined as net operational income divided by 
financial revenue. The ratios profit margin and assets utilization is the decomposed return on 
assets. Usually, it is normal to use the profit margin defined as Net income divided by total 
revenues. The profit margin looks at the profits relative to total revenues (Ledgerwood, 1998). 
However, due to the microfinance dataset not having any records for taxes before 2003, the net 
operational income was elected instead of the net income in order to keep the observations from 
1999 to 2003.  
𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛 =  
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒
 
The net operating income is all expenses before the extraordinary income and expenses, donations 
and taxes subtracted from the revenues. For both MFIs and Norwegian savings banks the Net 
operational income will be used. 
5.4.3 Operating Self-Sufficiency (OSS) 
Armendáriz and Morduch (2010) reported the operating self-sufficiency (OSS) measure. This 
ratio measures the extent to which the operational revenues of a microfinance institution cover its 
operating expenses. Defined as: 
𝑂𝑆𝑆 =
𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑠
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑛 (𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛 𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 )
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Operational revenue is all revenue generated by the operations conducted by the banks. It consists 
of interest and fees by borrowers, financial revenue, but also investments and other services as 
insurance and sales, other operational revenue. Financial expense is the cost of raising capital, 
interest and fees the institution pays to commercial banks, shareholders, investors and depositors. 
Loan-loss provision expense is the amount that is set aside to cover loans from defaults. The last 
item is the operational expenses, which cover rent, staff wages, transport costs and more. Same as 
for ROA, the MFI dataset provide the OSS without any calculations and just defined as the OSS. 
To test the reliability of the OSS given in the dataset, the same calculation test as conducted for 
ROA, is performed for the OSS. As the deviation between the calculated OSS and the given OSS 
is not at a noteworthy level we consider the given OSS to be reliable. The same formula will be 
utilized for the Norwegian savings banks. 
CGAP consensus guidelines (CGAP, 2003) recommend that additional to operational expense 
both financial expense and loan-loss provision expense should be included, since they are normal 
(and significant) cost of operations. While some argue that OSS should not include financing 
expense, since not all MFI incur financing costs equally (Ledgerwood, 1998). MFIs may fund all 
their loans with grants or concessional loans and do not need to borrow funds or collect savings 
and thus either do not incur any financing costs or incur minimal costs (Ledgerwood, 1998). We 
chose to have both financial expense and loan-loss provision in our OSS measure and this may be 
a weakness, as all MFIs may not be financed equally. 
The OSS ratio is often expressed as a percent. A value of 100% indicates full operational self-
sufficiency, while a value below 100% indicates that the institution must rely on continued 
outside funding to maintain its current level of operations (Armendáriz & Morduch, 2010).  
If the OSS is not achieved, eventually MFIs equity (loan funding capital) will be reduced due to 
losses. This will result in smaller amounts of funds to be used as loans given to borrowers, which 
may lead MFIs to go bankrupt as funds run out. To prevent this, they need to raise additional 
grants to cover the operational shortfalls. To increase the operating self-sufficiency one must 
either increase the yield (return on assets) or decrease the expenses (financial expenses, provisions 
for loan losses, or operating expense) (Ledgerwood, 1998). 
5.4.4 Cost-Income Ratio (CIR) 
A popular efficiency ratio in the banking industry is the Cost Income Ratio (CIR), which also is 
widely used as a yardstick when comparing banks’ productivity and efficiency. CIR is a ratio that 
calculates costs with respect to revenue. The commonly held notion is that a high CIR is 
  
26 
equivalent to low productivity and low efficiency and vice versa (Burger & Moormann, 2008). 
Defined as: 
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =  
𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠
𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
 
Operational expenses are the cost of doing business and do not include the financial expenses as 
these are a part of the denominator. They are directly extracted from both datasets and used in the 
calculations. Operational income, compared to operational revenue, is calculated as net financial 
revenue together with other operational revenue whereas operational revenue is financial revenue 
and other financial revenue.  
“Banks situated in a country with comparatively high interest margins ceteris paribus appear to be 
more productive than others” (Burger & Moormann, 2008, p. 87). Microfinance institutions have 
a higher risk exposure than Norwegian savings banks, which may suggest that they might appear 
more efficient than Norwegian savings banks. Nonetheless, considering that microfinance has 
significantly higher operational expenses gives reasons to believe they are not more efficient than 
Norwegian savings banks.  
Microfinance institutions and Norwegian savings banks can use this measure to analyse how costs 
changes compared to the income, which is very important when operating in a market where cost 
control is essential. 
Burger and Moormann (2008) pointed out that CIR has limited prediction power and suggested an 
adjusted CIR. They pointed out that factors such as interest rate, commission fees and factor costs 
had an impact on the CIR, and that those factors could vary between countries. Additionally, non-
recurring items, how much risk a bank take, economic cycles and accounting principles may 
affect CIR. Burger and Moormann (2008) suggested adjusting CIR with respect to interest 
margins and for national difference in labour costs. Due the scope of this thesis, we do not have 
the sufficient time, knowledge or data to perform such an adjustment. 
5.4.5 Operational Expenses 
Operational expenses are treated the same way as in section 5.4.4 and are extracted directly from 
both datasets. 
𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠  𝑎𝑠 % 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 =  
𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑥𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
Total assets are given as average total assets for the Norwegian savings banks, whereas for the 
MFIs, they are as reported in the balance sheet at the end of a given period. For the MFIs, total 
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assets are converted in to averages by taking the total assets for the year before and the particular 
year divided by two. This means the first year of observations are shifted one year giving us a 
period from 1999 to 2012.  
5.4.6 Net Financial Revenues 
The financial revenues and expenses are directly extracted from the dataset for both MFIs and 
Norwegian savings banks. They are calculated in percent of total assets. 
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑠 as % of total assets =  
𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑠 − 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
The net financial revenue is an important source of earnings. Net financial revenues describe the 
difference between financial revenues from loan portfolio, loan investments and other operating 
revenues from interest paid on borrowings, deposits and other financial expenses. We will 
compare net financial revenues in relation to average total assets for both industries in the period 
1995 through 2014. Net financial revenue explains the earnings MFIs and Norwegian savings 
banks get from lending activities. Net interest income is strengthened through increased financial 
revenues and reduces financial expenses. 
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6 Methodology 
Methodology is a procedure for gathering empirical data, an instrument for giving a description of 
the so-called reality. Good knowledge about methodology is important to distinguish between 
results created by the chosen methodology and reality (Jacobsen, 2010). 
The methodology is selected for this thesis is to answer its main research question and sub-
research questions in the best possible way and to create a good structure. The research question is 
formulated as the following: 
Can microfinance institutions become more efficient by learning from Norwegian savings 
banks? 
1. Are MFIs becoming more efficient over time? 
2. How do MFIs compare against Norwegian savings banks? 
3. What have Norwegian savings banks done to become so efficient and can these 
innovations be transferred to MFIs? 
To answer sub-research question one, we are first going to construct a graph illustrating the 
development of the operational expenses of the MFIs to test if they become more efficient with 
time. Then, a t-test will be performed to see whether there is a significant change in the mean 
from the first year to the last. This test will answer our first hypothesis. Secondly, we are going to 
conduct a panel regression to test our second hypothesis, were age is the independent variable to 
estimate whether the age of an MFI has an effect on the operational expenses and portfolio yield. 
For sub-research question two we are comparing an excerpt of the financial statements and 
accounting ratios, which is based on Mersland and Strøm (2014) article on measuring 
microfinance. With these accounting ratios we will test the sustainability and efficiency measures 
to see how those evolve during the time period. Through this, we can illustrate the differences in a 
clear and straightforward manner and give an answer to our third hypothesis. We will utilize the 
ratios ROA, operational profit margin, OSS, CIR, net financial revenue and operational expenses 
in percent of total assets. There will also be conducted t-test to see if the differences in the means 
for the MFIs and Norwegian savings banks are significant. For sub-research question three we 
talked to key personnel in Eika group through email to get Eika’s insights on the subject. Lastly, 
we will look at the Norwegian savings banks and the possibilities for transferring their focus on 
cost reduction and technological developments over to the microfinance industry, which answers 
our fourth hypothesis. 
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6.1 Research Design 
Research design is designing the research in such a way that the requisite data can be gathered and 
analysed to arrive at a solution for the problem. A research design includes collection, 
measurement, and analysis of data, based on the research question of the study (Sekaran & 
Bougie, 2013) 
6.1.1 Methodological Approach 
When collecting data we usually distinguish between two methodological approaches, deductive 
and inductive. A deductive approach implies from theoretical to empirical. With this approach 
you start with forming expectations about how reality is based on earlier research and theories. 
Then gathering empirical data, to test whether expectations actually matching with reality. The 
criticism for this approach is that the researcher only looks for relevant information that he or she 
finds relevant to back up the anticipating outcome (Jacobsen, 2010). 
The alternative is the inductive methodological approach, which is from empirical to theoretical. 
This approach begins with gathering relevant information from the reality, then systemises the 
information and creates a theory. Critics with this approach have been that it is impossible and 
naive to think people can have a totally open mind. Modern psychological research has found that 
people do not have the capacity to collect all relevant information (Jacobsen, 2010). 
The purpose of this thesis has been to research and identify possibilities for microfinance 
institutions to be more efficient by learning from Norwegian savings banks. This is done through 
testing whether MFIs is becoming more efficient with time, in terms of operational expenses. 
Additionally, we will test whether age has an effect on operational expenses. Next we research if 
there exists differences between MFIs and Norwegian savings banks and finally if MFIs can learn 
from Norwegian savings banks. With basis in theory and earlier research we have built 
expectations, then we gathered empirical evidence to consider if the expectations are coherent 
with what we see in the reality. This is the reason for why our thesis uses a deductive 
methodological approach. 
6.1.2 Purpose of the Study 
When distinguishing the purpose of the study, one can separate it in to three different purposes; 
exploratory, descriptive and causal. An exploratory study can be defined to explore, the objective 
of a descriptive study is to describe, and lastly, a causal study is to find the cause-effect 
relationship (Sekaran & Bougie, 2013). 
Descriptive studies are used when collecting data that describe the characteristics of persons, 
events or situations. We answer our research question mainly based on the collected data from 
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473 MFIs from 77 different countries spanning 15 years and 81 Norwegian savings banks 
spanning 20 years, which makes our thesis descriptive. Sub-research question three, studies what 
Norwegian savings banks have done to become cost efficient, and if innovations done in Norway 
can be transferred to MFIs. The first part is based on earlier research, theories and talking to key 
informants from the banking industry in Norway and therefore this sub-research question has a 
descriptive purpose. However, the last part is about the future and there exists little or no earlier 
research about this, and therefore the sub-research question also has an exploratory purpose. 
6.2 Data Materials  
In this chapter we will describe what methodological approaches that has been used when 
gathering, processing and analysing the data. We will define key aspects related to these processes 
and evaluate the quality of the datasets.  
6.2.1 Primary and Secondary Data 
Whether the data collected are primary or secondary data all depends on how they are collected 
and for what purpose. Primary data is data collected by the researcher directly from the primary 
source in which the researcher is investigating. This is data that are of specific interest for the 
purpose of the study, and the collection is carried out first-hand. This makes the data specifically 
tailored to the research’s purpose. On the other hand we have secondary data. This is data that are 
collected from another source where the data were collected for another purpose than the 
researcher are going to use it for. This is data collected from sources that already exist. Secondary 
data can be company records, websites, financial statements and government publications 
(Sekaran & Bougie, 2013). 
The data used in this study are mostly secondary data obtained from Finance Norway and the 
Mersland dataset. The only primary data are collected directly from the Eika group through email. 
The advantage of using secondary data is that it saves time and cost when it comes to the 
collection process. One drawback of using secondary data is that, over time, the data will be 
obsolete and it is therefore important to make sure that the data is up-to-date and the information 
are current (Sekaran & Bougie, 2013). 
6.2.2 Qualitative and Quantitative Data 
The methodology literature separates between qualitative and quantitative methods. To 
distinguish between these, one separate mainly on how the data is gathered and analysed. 
Qualitative method has a focus on data that is text while quantitative method focuses on data that 
is numbers (Jacobsen, 2010). This thesis mainly uses quantitative data, but also have a part of 
qualitative data. 
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With a quantitative approach it is necessary to categorize and structure before gathering data. This 
requires clear variables and values that can be assigned numbers. The gathering of information 
requires a more closed approach. The advantages with quantitative data are that the information is 
easier to process and to generalize because of the large material. Additionally, a quantitative 
approach can be characterized, as describing a given circumstance relatively accurate and that you 
do not develop a personal connection to certain respondents. The disadvantage with this 
methodology is that it can give a superficial touch because of the focus to reach many units and 
thus being neither complex, nor deep enough (Jacobsen, 2010). 
A qualitative approach has the advantage that it emphasizes details, nuance and the uniqueness of 
each respondent, which gives the approach its openness. With the qualitative approach one 
gathers data and then categorize and structure the information. Advantages with this approach are 
the flexibility and possibility to change the research question and that there is an unclear selection 
between gathering data and the analysis. Disadvantages with qualitative approach are that it is 
resources intensive and problems with generalization arise with small samples. Additionally, it 
can be problematic with complex data materials and that researchers unconsciously screening out 
information (Jacobsen, 2010). 
The analysis of microfinance and Norwegian savings banks are rooted in the dataset and the 
annual financial statements, which makes this thesis quantitative. These accounting numbers are 
applied when analysing whether MFIs are becoming more efficient over time and when 
comparing both industries. Additionally, it can be discussed if a qualitative approach should be 
used for sub-research question three. We have sent emails to key personnel in the Norwegian 
banking industry to gather information about what made the Norwegian savings banks, so cost 
efficient, which is a qualitative approach. Further we also used earlier research on the innovative 
development in Norway. Using the two approaches are considered to be complementary, not 
competing (Jacobsen, 2010) and may therefore be an advantage. 
6.2.3 Reliability 
Three reliability types that are used in quantitative research, identified by Kirk and Miller (1986) 
are: 
1. To what degree a measurement that is repeated remains the same 
2. The stability of a measurement over time  
3. The similarity of the measurements given within a set time period. 
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From this, we interpret that the reliability tells us, to what extent, which results are consistent over 
time and if the results of a study can be reproduced under a similar methodology (Golafshani, 
2003). 
The data for the Norwegian savings banks are all collected from official and public annual 
accounts for savings banks published by Finance Norway. The dataset consists of all savings 
banks registered in Norway and are available from 1995 through 2014. Not all banks are 
represented all 20 years, so in order to increase the reliability we found 84 banks that report all 
years. We also removed the largest banks from the dataset and were left with 81 banks. They are 
all subjects to Norwegian law and all are reported similar to each other making these data reliable.  
The Microfinance part of our study is based on the observations of 473 rated Microfinance 
institutions from 77 different countries. The data are collected by third-party organizations, which 
have standardized the ratings. The dataset includes both financial and outreach data, thus making 
it well suited when studying microfinance. The dataset is unbalanced since not all MFIs report 
regularly or some started their business after the collection for the data commenced. As there are 
MFIs from different countries there might be differences between them that the data do not 
portrait. This contributes to lower the reliability compared to the dataset for the Norwegian 
savings banks.  
Reliable data do not always mean that the data used are all valid. 
6.2.4 Validity 
Validity is a measure that determines how truthful the research results are and gives an indication 
of whether ones research truly measures that which it was intended to measure. In other words, 
does the research instrument allow you to hit "the bull’s eye" of your research object? 
(Golafshani, 2003). Validity can be divided into internal and external where the first refers to the 
faith we have in the cause-and-effect relationship. The latter refers to what extent the results found 
can be generalized or transferred over to actual, real world, settings (Sekaran & Bougie, 2013).  
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6.3 Regression Method 
Regression is used to study the relationship between a dependent variable and one or several 
independent variables. The purpose of the analysis is to estimate the coefficients (𝛽𝑡), which 
represents to what degree the independent variables affect the dependent variable (Wooldridge, 
2013). You can either use a simple regression model with one independent variable or a multiple 
regression analysis that includes several independent variables. A multiple regression equation 
can be written as 
𝑦 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥1 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑘 𝑥𝑘 + 𝑢 
6.3.1 The Regression Equation for Panel Data 
Data containing time series observations of each cross-sectional member in the dataset are 
referred to as panel data. Cross-sectional data refers to data that has several units that have been 
observed over the same time period. In difference to a pooled cross-sectional dataset a panel 
dataset has cross-sectional units that are followed over a given period of time. Even though panel 
data can be harder to obtain than cross-sectional data there are several advantages of having a 
panel dataset. By having several observations for one particular unit over time enables us to study 
unobserved characteristics of that unit. Panel data can also help studying lags in behaviour since 
some effects only acts after some time has passed (Wooldridge, 2013). 
With panel data one usually obtain a higher degree of freedom and more variability in the sample 
than one would obtain with cross-sectional data or time series data. Observations in panel data 
involve at least two dimensions; the time series dimension, indicated by subscript t, and the cross-
sectional dimension, indicated by subscript i. These two can be viewed as having either i = 1 for 
the first and t = 1 for the latter (Torres-Reyna, 2007). 
The regression equation for panel data can be written as 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑑𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 
Y is our dependant variable and will in our case be represented by operational expenses in percent 
of total assets for our first regression and portfolio yield for the second regression. The notation i 
represent the banks and since we have 473 we will have i = 1, …, 473. The data are for a period of 
13 years, from 1999 to 2011 making t = 1, …, 13. 𝛽0 represents our constant, also called intercept, 
and indicates where the equation will intercept the y-axis. Our explanatory variables are indicated 
by x. All variables have been explained in section 5.3. The x is followed by the notation it since 
the regression will measure each variable for every bank every year. The 𝛽 represent the 
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coefficients for the explanatory variables and tells us how the equation is affected by a specific 
variable (Wooldridge, 2013).  
The equation also includes time-period dummy variables 𝑑𝑡, which will take the value 1 or 0. We 
will have one dummy for each year giving the dummy for year 1, 1999, the value of 1 and all 
others 0. 𝛾 is the coefficient for the dummy variables and the 𝛾 for 1999 will then be 𝛾 ∗ 1 for 
t = 1 and 𝛾 for the other dummies will be 𝛾 ∗ 0 for t = 1. This means that the intercept will be 
𝛽0 + 𝛾1999  for t = 1, 𝛽0 + 𝛾2000  for t = 2 and so forth (Wooldridge, 2013).  
All effects that are not captured by our explanatory variables are represented by the 𝑢𝑖𝑡. This is 
the error term, also called the idiosyncratic error or time-varying error. It is almost impossible to 
include all explanatory variables that affect the dependent variable, so the error picks up all the 
unexplained effects in the model that change over time and affects 𝑦𝑖𝑡. The error term consists of 
two components, one that changes over time, 𝜇𝑖 , and one that is consistent, 𝑣𝑖𝑡 (Wooldridge, 
2013): 
𝑢𝑖𝑡 = 𝜇𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡  
To measure the goodness of fit for the model we will utilize the R-squared. The standard R-
squared measures how much the variation in the dependent variable is explained by the 
explanatory variables. The within R-squared will be used for fixed effects models since we can 
observe how much the time variation in the dependent variable are explained by the time variation 
in our explanatory variables. For the random effects models the overall R-squared will be used 
(Wooldridge, 2013). 
6.3.2 Fixed Effects Estimation 
The fixed effect captures all unobserved effects that are time-constant and are written as 𝑎𝑖 . These 
are effects that are specific to each variable. By using fixed effects transformation we eliminate 
the 𝑎𝑖 , this because we believe it to be correlated with one or more of the explanatory variables. 
We will then obtain so called time-demeaned data on y, x and u and are left with the fixed effects 
estimator which allows, in any time-period, that 𝑎𝑖  and the explanatory variables to be correlated. 
This again means that the 𝜇𝑖  correlates with the 𝑥𝑖𝑡. This model, when utilized, will also omit all 
explanatory variables that are constant over time because the fixed effects transformation sweeps 
away all constant variables (Wooldridge, 2013).  
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Wooldridge (2013) presented the assumptions for fixed effects estimation as 
1. For each i, the model is 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1𝑥𝑖𝑡1 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑘 𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑘 + 𝑎𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 , 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇,  
where the 𝛽𝑗 are the parameters to estimate and 𝑎𝑖  is the unobserved effect. 
 
2. Each explanatory variable changes over time (for at least some i), and no perfect linear 
relationships exist among the explanatory variables. 
 
3. For each t, the expected value of the idiosyncratic error, 𝑢𝑖𝑡, given the explanatory 
variables, 𝑥𝑖𝑡, in all time periods and the unobserved effect, 𝑎𝑖 , is zero 
𝐸(𝑢𝑖𝑡|𝑥𝑖 , 𝑎𝑖) = 0 
 
4. 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑢𝑖𝑡|𝑥𝑖 , 𝑎𝑖) = 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑢𝑖𝑡) = 𝜎𝑢
2 , for all 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇 
 
5. No autocorrelation shall occur in 𝑢𝑖𝑡  
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑢𝑖𝑡 , 𝑢𝑖𝑠|𝑥𝑖 , 𝑎𝑖) = 0 
 
6. Conditional on 𝑥𝑖  and 𝑎𝑖 , the 𝑢𝑖𝑡 are independent and identically distributed as 
Normal(0, 𝜎𝑢
2) 
6.3.3 Random Effects Estimation 
In section 6.3.2 we stated that if 𝑎𝑖  was correlated with the explanatory variables our goal were to 
eliminate it. If 𝑎𝑖  is uncorrelated with the explanatory variables a transformation to eliminate 𝑎𝑖 
leads to inefficient estimators. The assumptions under random effects estimation are more or less 
the same as the assumptions under fixed effects, except that it also include the requirement that 𝑎𝑖 
is independent from all 𝑥𝑖𝑡. This assumption will in most circumstances usually not hold. This can 
be circumvented by adding constant control variables, which will then draw from the error leading 
to a strengthened explanation power for the explanatory variables. This means that the correlation 
between the error and the explanatory variables will be reduced. In RE the time varying part of the 
error term, 𝜇𝑖 , is also considered to be a part of the error term, not spilt in a time varying error and 
a constant error (Wooldridge, 2013).  
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Wooldridge (2013) presented the assumptions for random effects estimation as 
1. For each i, the model is 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1𝑥𝑖𝑡1 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑘 𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑘 + 𝑎𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 , 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇,  
where the 𝛽𝑗 are the parameters to estimate and 𝑎𝑖  is the unobserved effect. 
 
2. There are no perfect, linear relationship between any of the explanatory variables X 
 
3. Each explanatory variable changes over time (for at least some i), and no perfect linear 
relationships exist among the explanatory variables. 
 
4. For each t, the expected value of the idiosyncratic error, 𝑢𝑖𝑡, given the explanatory 
variables, 𝑥𝑖𝑡, in all time periods and the unobserved effect, 𝑎𝑖 , is zero 
𝐸(𝑢𝑖𝑡|𝑥𝑖 , 𝑎𝑖) = 0 
 
5. 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑢𝑖𝑡|𝑥𝑖 , 𝑎𝑖) = 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑢𝑖𝑡) = 𝜎𝑢
2 , for all 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇 
 
7. No autocorrelation shall occur in 𝑢𝑖𝑡  
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑢𝑖𝑡 , 𝑢𝑖𝑠|𝑥𝑖 , 𝑎𝑖) = 0 
 
6. Conditional on 𝑥𝑖  and 𝑎𝑖 , the 𝑢𝑖𝑡 are independent and identically distributed as 
Normal(0, 𝜎𝑢
2) 
6.3.4 Hausman Test 
To determine whether to use fixed effects estimation or random effects estimation it is common to 
use both methods, and later test the statistically significant differences in the coefficients on the 
time-varying explanatory variables. To test these differences, we will perform a “Hausman test”. 
If the null hypothesis, that there are statistically significant differences in the coefficients is not 
rejected both FE and RE can be used since their estimates are sufficiently close, so it does not 
matter which method one uses. Rejecting the null hypothesis means that the assumptions for RE is 
not upheld and one must use FE (Wooldridge, 2013). 
6.4 T-test 
When analysing the trends and comparing MFIs against Norwegian savings bank we have to test 
whether these developments and differences are significant. Through testing for significant 
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differences between the first year of observations and the last year, the t-test states whether the 
change for this period is significant. There will also be tested whether there are differences 
between the means for MFIs and Norwegian savings banks for the variables that are to be 
compared against each other. These tests will be performed for all variables used in section 7.1 
and 7.3. The table in appendix A9 will state the t-values and the significance level either at a 10%, 
5% or a 1% level. All hypotheses for the t-tests will be that the differences in the means are equal 
zero, H0  = 0. If these hypotheses are rejected the alternative hypotheses states that there is a 
difference in the means, HA  ≠ 0 (Wooldridge, 2013). 
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7 Findings 
7.1 The Development in Operational Expenses for MFIs 
To answer our first hypothesis we utilize a ratio that illustrates whether or not microfinance 
achieves greater cost-efficiency over time, with respect to operational expenses. The ratio 
operational expenses in percent of average total assets are highly important in the microfinance 
industry, due to the effect it has on the portfolio yield. Microfinance is also a highly labour-
intensive industry and the ratio illustrates the daily operations. 
 
Figure 5: Operational expenses in percent of total assets for MFIs. 
Figure 5 illustrates a decreasing operational expense whereas we notice increases in three periods, 
2002 to 2004, 2005 to 2006 and 2007 to 2009. The overall effect is unmistakeably illustrating a 
decrease in the selected period for the microfinance as a whole. Microfinance started with an 
operational expense ratio of 23.06% in 2000. In the period 2000 to 2011 the MFIs have reduced 
their cost with 24.19%, ending up with an expense ratio of 17.48%. Hug (2014) and Rosenberg et 
al. (2013) stated that operational expenses are the largest determinant of the interest yield and the 
results we find in our study can possibly verify the general decrease in the interest yield 
Rosenberg et al. (2013) found. Moreover, after performing a t-test with unequal variances we did 
find that there are significant differences in the means for 2000 and 2011, hence the data 
statistically support the hypothesis that MFIs are becoming more cost-efficient with time. The 
output for the t-test can be found in appendix A9. 
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7.2 Regression Analysis 
In this chapter we will discuss our findings after running the panel regression analyses for 
operational expenses in percent of total assets and portfolio yield. The goal of the regression 
analyses is to test our hypothesis stating that age has an effect on the MFIs operating expenses. 
The two regressions differ in the sense that the dependent variables are different from one another. 
Since the dependent variable in the first regression accounts for the size of the MFI due to being a 
proxy for the operational expenses in percent of total assets there is no control variable for the size 
of the firm. Therefore, for the latter regression, there will be a size variable as one of the control 
variables.  
We are running a regression using a panel dataset and similar to Mersland and Strøm (2010b) 
utilized both a random and fixed effects model. If the regressions produce similar coefficients, and 
are significant, this will further increase our faith in the results. As seen in appendix A6 the 
regressions for random effects and fixed effects yield different results. This is due the fact that the 
fixed effects model performs the regression on the individual averages subtracted from the annual 
averages. Moreover, when running a fixed effects model the fixed effects transformation aims to 
eliminate the time varying error term. Whereas in a random effects model, this is considered as 
being a part of the error term and therefore not eliminated (Wooldridge, 2013). Due to the 
difference in results we need to establish whether we are to use the fixed effects or random effects 
estimation.  
As described in section 6.3.4 we utilize the Hausman test as a tool to decide whether to use 
random or fixed effects estimation. The results of the test can be found in the appendix A3. After 
running the test we cannot reject the null hypothesis for regression (1) and (3). The Hausman test 
for regression (2) and (4) tells us that we have to reject the null hypothesis meaning we have to 
run fixed effects estimation. Therefore, we have selected to run fixed effects estimation on both 
regressions, as explained in section 6.3.4, since when rejected, both FE and RE can be used. This 
is so that both regressions will be under the same assumptions and conditions.  
Furthermore, to not violate the assumptions for FE we cluster by banks since this makes the 
model robust against autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. 
The R-squared for these regressions are 0.2051 for the first and 0.0597 for the latter. Considering 
that we only have six and seven explanatory variables, there are a lot of the dependent variables 
that should be explained by the error term. We consider the R-squared for (1) to be good and a 
low for (2).  
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Table 3: Regression results with fixed effects. 
From regression (1), seen in table 3, we have two variables that are statistically significant at 1% 
level and one at a 10%. Our age variable is not statistically significant, which does not support our 
hypothesis that the age of an MFI affects the operational expenses. Even though Age is not 
statistically significant we note that the coefficient is negative. Furthermore, given that Age was 
statistically significant, this would be the expected relationship between this variable and 
operational expense. The other variables, except our dummy variables, have a negative relation, 
which was expected.  
As individual loans are our base group for our dummies we need to interpret the coefficients for 
Village Loan and Solidarity Group in relation to individual loans. Armendáriz and Morduch 
(2010) perceived village loans to be an efficient form of loan methodology, and therefore the 
positive coefficient is not in accordance with their prediction for this variable. Furthermore, they 
Age -0.00458891 0.00307048
(0.00318912) (0.00400623)
Average Loan -6.954E-06 -6.941E-06
(4.986E-06) (8.923E-06)
Personnel Productivity -0.00042199 *** 0.0000535
(0.00011848) (0.00004103)
GDP per Capita -0.00002576 * -3.126E-06
(0.00001441) (7.158E-06)
Village Loan (dummy) 0.12879357 *** 0.0278563 **
(0.00841189) (0.01228145)
Solidarity Group (dummy) -0.00244192 -0.07709062 ***
(0.0136257) (0.02508136)
Size -0.03116815 **
(0.01502746)
Intercept 0.36384569 *** 0.84162844 ***
(0.03228197) (0.19519495)
Observations 925 1029
R-squared 0.20509547 0.0596706
(1) and (2) are regressed using operational expenses and portfolio yield as the dependent 
variables and utilizing fixed effects model
Operational expenses are divided by total assets, which is the reason for size not being 
included in (1).
Village Loan (dummy) states whether the MFIs provide loans to groups consisting of a 
whole village.
Solidarity Group (dummy) states whether the MFIs provide loans to smaller groups
The size variable is the ln of total assets.
Robust standard errors in parenthesis; 
Statistical significance: * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
Variables
Fixed Effects Model
(1) (2)
Operational Expenses Portfolio Yield
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also perceived this loan methodology to be more cost efficient than individual loans. Our 
coefficient tells us that village loans are 12.88% less cost effective than individual loans. This is 
troublesome especially since the variable is statistically significant at a 1% level. On the other 
hand, this result supports the findings of Mersland and Strøm (2010a) that the cost of maintaining 
group loans excided the benefits of these loan methods. Our prediction for this variable was 
ambiguous, meaning we did not know where to predict the effect of this variable. The results 
support the claim that group loans are not as efficient as individual loans. The same interpretation 
can be done for solidarity group loans, but since this variable is not statistically significant at any 
level this is not of the biggest importance, but is something worth noticing. 
Portfolio yield is supposed to cover the operational expenses, financial expenses, provision 
expenses and the net margin, also referred to as profit, (Hug, 2014; Rosenberg et al., 2013) and 
have therefore a relation to operational expenses. Therefore, as a control we want to test the age 
against the portfolio yield. We use the same explanatory variables as in the first regression except 
that we now include the natural logarithm of total assets to act as a measure of the MFI’s size.  
In regression (2), Age is not statistically significant supporting the results from regression (1) that 
the age of the MFI does not affect the operational expenses. Furthermore, both our dummies are 
significant, but they have different signs for the coefficients. Village loans, according to 
regression (2), have a portfolio yield that is 2.79% higher than the portfolio yield for individual 
loans. For solidarity group loans the portfolio yield is 7.71% lower than the portfolio yield for 
individual loans. Respectively, Village Loan and Solidarity Group are statistically significant at a 
5% level for the first and 1% level for the latter. Our size measure is also statistically significant 
and tells us that the lager the bank the lower the portfolio yields. This is because the sign of the 
coefficient is negative which can also show signs of economies of scale. This is a common 
presumption drawn from basic economic theory. 
It is a little worrying that two of the control variables that were statistically significant in 
regression (1) are not statistically significant in (2). Operational expenses should have an 
influence on the portfolio yield and therefore we thought that the results would be more similar. 
This can be because there are a lot more factors that influence the yield than our variables.  
The complete output for the regression can be found in appendix A4, A5 and an overview of the 
results in appendix A6. 
7.3 Comparing Norwegian Savings Banks and MFIs 
Norwegian savings banks and microfinance institutions are on opposite sides of the scale. It will 
therefore be interesting to investigate differences in the financial statements and ratios. We have 
  
42 
based our analysis on Mersland and Strøm (2014) article on “measuring microfinance” and taken 
the same accounting figures and ratios as them. They use main accounting figures for the average 
MFI and with these accounting figures measure the most commonly used ratios. The ratios used 
are ROA, Profit Margin, and OSS, which measure sustainability and profitability. Additionally, 
we added cost income ratio, net financial revenue and operational expenses. These ratios are 
highly used in Norwegian savings banks and measures efficiency. This is done to answer our third 
hypothesis to test whether there exist differences between the two industries. 
7.3 1 Financial Statements 
Table 4 and 5 presents the accounting figures in relation to average total assets and total revenue 
for both industries. The numbers here are all averages for the entire period for both microfinance 
institutions and Norwegian savings banks. Appendix A7 and A8 gives a more detailed 
presentation of table 4 and 5. 
 
Table 4: Descriptive analysis for MFIs. 
 
Table 5: Descriptive analysis for Norwegian savings banks. 
When looking at the calculations from table 4 and 5, they illustrate that financial revenue, 
financial expenses and operational expense constitute the largest items in the income statements 
for both Norwegian savings banks and Microfinance institutions. The standard deviations for the 
mentioned key figures are all larger than the means. This was to be expected for the MFIs, since 
there are a large variation in size and age, and therefore these measures will vary in the size as 
Variables 
Microfinance 
institutions Mean Median Stand. Dev.
% of Total 
Assets
% of Financial 
Revenues Obs
Financial Revenue 2.6257 0.9178 5.6267 30.52 % 100.00 % 2036
Financial expenses 0.5409 0.1144 1.4663 4.71 % 17.80 % 2163
Net Financial Revenue 2.1209 0.7593 4.4867 25.71 % 82.20 % 2027
Loan loss provisions 0.2107 0.0422 0.7221 2.07 % 8.05 % 2165
Financial Margin 1.9178 0.7004 4.0551 23.70 % 74.52 % 2015
Operational expenses 1.4852 0.6080 2.7559 21.36 % 84.80 % 2241
CIR 0.9428 0.7761 0.7315 1996
Total assets 11.5000 4.0306 23.9000 100.00 % 445.07 % 1753
Total Portfolio 8.6466 2.8232 19.5000 89.86 % 395.20 % 2266
All numbers execpt CIR are in $million
Variables 
Norwegian savings 
banks Mean Median  Stand. Dev. 
% of Total 
Assets
% of Financial 
Revenues Obs
Financial Revenue 18.4268          11.4269          27.8578          5.91 % 100.00 % 1620
Financial expenses 10.8597          5.9455            20.2222          3.20 % 53.30 % 1620
Net Financial Revenue 7.5671            5.2629            8.3770            2.71 % 46.70 % 1620
Loan loss provisions 3.0398            1.8912            4.2025            1.20 % 20.38 % 1620
Financial Margin 4.5273            2.9167            5.6298            1.52 % 26.32 % 1620
Operational expenses 5.4678            3.5792            6.6861            1.88 % 32.99 % 1620
CIR 0.5770            0.5714            0.1009            1620
Total assets 357.6805        198.7627        540.1404        100.00 % 1827.24 % 1620
Total Portfolio 311.5080        181.2411        442.6953        89.30 % 1623.51 % 1620
All numbers execpt CIR are in $million
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well. For the Norwegian savings banks, we expected the standard deviation to be smaller. These 
banks also vary in size, which may explain the size of the standard deviation. How much the 
observations differ from the mean is measured by the variance. Since the variance is squared to 
eliminate the negative numbers, the standard deviation represent the variance, but in the same unit 
of measurement as the variables (Johannessen, Kristoffersen, & Tufte, 2004). 
When looking at the two tables it is evident that there are some differences between Norwegian 
savings banks and MFIs. To get a better understanding of the relative sizes of the key figures, we 
elected to include them in percent of both total assets and financial revenue. Operational expenses 
and financial revenue for the MFIs are much larger relative to their total assets than for 
Norwegian savings banks.  
If we stay with the operational expense and analyse them in percent of financial revenues, we see 
that the MFIs’ are substantially higher than for the Norwegian savings banks. The MFIs have, on 
average, an operational expense that is 84.80% of their financial revenue. If we add all other costs 
of doing business to this equation we will get the CIR and we can see that they are just barely able 
to cover their costs. This leaves next to nothing for the profit, the cost of default and other 
expenses, including tax. On the other hand, the Norwegian savings banks’ operational expenses 
are only 32.99% of the financial revenue and their CIR is just above 0.5. This is consistent with 
Mersland and Strøm (2014), that said that microfinance is a labour-intensive industry. We will 
further evaluate the CIR variable later in this section. 
Now let us look at net financial revenue, which is calculated by subtracting financial expenses 
from financial revenue. Net financial revenue is the main source of income for both microfinance 
institutions and Norwegian savings banks. We see that in relation to the total assets the net 
financial revenue is substantially higher for MFIs than Norwegian savings banks. In relation to 
total assets, we see that the percentage for the MFIs well excides the Norwegian savings banks. If 
we decompose the variable and turn our focus to financial revenue and financial expenses: The 
size of the MFIs financial revenues in percent of total assets is 30.52%, whereas for the 
Norwegian savings banks they are only 5.91% However, the financial expenses divided by assets 
are very similar and divided by revenues the expenses is lower for MFIs than Norwegian savings 
banks.  
These differences between these two are also very evident in the total assets in percent of financial 
revenue. Where the Norwegian savings banks have an asset to revenue ratio of 1827.24%, MFIs 
have a ratio that is more than four times lower than the Norwegian savings banks’ ratio. The total 
portfolio for MFIs is also four times lower than the Norwegian savings banks’. However, the 
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portfolio in percent of total assets is almost identical, telling us that they both have the same 
portfolio size relative to the bank size. 
Now we know which financial figures that are substantial in the financial statements and have a 
basic understanding of the differences. Financial revenue, financial expenses and operational 
expenses are the largest items in our excerpt. Further, we want to add those important financial 
figures into financial ratios and look at how they have been developing over the time period. 
In the next part of this section we will take a look at different financial ratios. 
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7.3.2 Accounting Ratios 
Return on assets 
Return on assets, measures how well an MFI uses its total assets to generate returns (CGAP, 
2003). From 1999 to 2009 there has been a decline from 1% to 0.15% in the American savings 
bank sector (Saunders & Cornett, 2011). Figure 6 illustrates that the Norwegian savings banks had 
a decline in the same period from 1.21% to 0.66%. They had a large dip in 2008, but they have 
been rather protected against the financial crisis. For Microfinance institutions however, we 
cannot see a decline in 2008, but an increase in ROA. For the whole period, MFIs had more or 
less a steady increase in ROA, even with some negative periods. The fluctuations may be a result 
of new microfinance institutions starting or stopping to report their financial numbers. The initial 
years, microfinance had a negative ROA which may be a result of few microfinance institutions in 
the dataset and that there are large differences between microfinance institutions in terms of 
profitability. 
 
Figure 6: Comparison of Return on Assets. 
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Operational profit margin 
The profit margin looks at profits relative to total revenues earned (Ledgerwood, 2014). As 
illustrated in figure 7, Norwegian banks fluctuate between 7.39% and 31.80%, which indicate a 
large variance. We see that in 2008, most likely due to the financial crises, the profit dips 
tremendously. However, the next couple of years there is a resurgence leading to a large increase. 
After another decline in 2011 the operational profit margin climes to 27.39% in 2014. The trend 
for the Norwegian savings banks is slightly decreasing. The growth of the trend line is -0.0001 
indicating that the trend is almost constant for this period. 
Microfinance institutions have a steady increase in the operational profit margin with a few years 
of decline. The margin increases from -17.42% to 11.99%, which shows a clear positive trend for 
this key figure. Even with a decline from 2007 to 2009, the latest trends shows that the MFIs are 
creating higher profits.  
 
Figure 7: Comparison of the operational profit margin. 
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Operational expenses 
This ratio test whether or not MFIs and Norwegian savings banks achieves greater cost-efficiency 
over time, with respect to operational expenses. Discussion of the operational expenses for MFIs 
is discussed in section 7.1. Figure 8 illustrates a clearly decreasing operating expense for 
Norwegian saving banks, whereas we notice that in 2010 and forwards, Norwegian savings banks 
seems to be hitting their minimum level. Norwegian savings banks started with a ratio of 2.70% in 
1995. In the period 1995 to 2014, Norwegian savings banks have reduced their cost with 44.11%, 
ending up with an expense ratio of 1.51%. This is a result of the large development in the field of 
IT and self-service solutions, which again allows Norwegian savings banks to except reduced net 
financial revenue. 
It is worth noticing that if we look at the period 2000 to 2011 for both industries, microfinance 
reduced their cost with 24.19% while Norwegian savings banks with 31.75%. It is interesting that 
one of the world’s most cost-efficient banks manage to reduce their cost more than microfinance 
considering their already low cost level.  
 
Figure 8: Comparison of operational expenses in percent of  total assets. 
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Operating self-sufficiency 
Operating self-sufficiency measures how well an MFI covers its costs through operating revenues 
(CGAP, 2003). Operating self-sufficiency is not fluctuating as much as the other ratios. Both 
Norwegian savings banks and microfinance institutions have a slight positive trend. Over the 
entire period, Norwegian savings banks are above 100%. As described in section 5.3.4, this 
implies that they do not rely on subsidies. When looking at microfinance for the entire period, we 
can see that MFIs are not sustainable the first year. This can be a result of a small set of 
observations the two first years. Microfinance institutions are above 100% for the rest of the 
period, which implies that MFIs on average also do not rely on outside funding to maintain its 
current level of operations.  
 
Figure 9: Comparison of the Operating Self-Sufficiency. 
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Net financial revenues (net interest income) 
The net financial revenues for the Norwegian savings banks are declining towards 2010 where 
they level out at 1.90%. They increase slightly, but returns to 1.90% in 2014. There are no sudden 
dips in the net financial revenues and the trend line has a clear negative slope.  
For microfinance they fluctuate a little more with a period of positive growth from 2001 to 2003. 
However, the next four years the net revenues decline before growing again towards 2010. 
Overall we see from the trend line that there is a weak, downwards trend throughout the period. 
 
Figure 10: Comparison of net financial revenue in percent of total assets. 
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Cost Income Ratio 
Cost income ratio is defined as operational expenses divided by operational revenues, which say 
something about the cost relative to income. Norwegian savings banks are at a significantly lower 
level than microfinance institutions. This indicates a good cost control and a strong focus on low 
costs for Norwegian savings banks. They are mainly located between 50-60%, but the trend line 
for the period is positive. Microfinance institutions on the other hand are located between 80-90%, 
but they have a negative trend. The graph illustrates in general a positive development, and 
improved cost-efficiency for microfinance. 
 
Figure 11: Comparison of the cost income ratio. 
7.3.3 Summary 
After all ratios are analysed it is clear that the trends for Norwegian savings banks are more stable 
compared to the MFIs, the only exception being net financial revenues in percent of total assets.  
However, in most cases the trends for the MFIs are converging towards the Norwegian savings 
banks’ level. These analyses of the financial statements and development of the key figures in 
together with the t-tests supports hypothesis three, that there are differences between the 
industries.  
In appendix A9, the t-test statistics for the variables used in this section are presented. We see that 
most of the developments for the different industries and the comparison between them are 
statistically significant at either a 10%, 5% or 1% level. 
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7.4 Norwegian Savings Banks’ Development 
The Nordic countries have the most cost efficient banks in the world (Little, 2007; Studemann, 
2007; The Economist, 2013). What have Norwegian savings banks done to become so cost-
efficient?  
After talked to key personnel in the Eika group through emails, they mention three actions that 
have been done in Norway, which are the basis of their low cost structure. Eika alliance consists 
of 74 savings banks, making the Eika group the biggest player in the Norwegian banking industry 
(Eika Group, 2016). 
Three main actions that have been done in Norway, which is the basis of the low costs  are: 
1. Norwegian savings banks are small enterprises in communities 
Basically, the savings banks are often small enterprises in a community with relatively low wages 
and little tradition of bonus and other expensive goods compared to major financial institutions. 
2. Cooperation between the Norwegian savings banks 
The savings banks in Norway have been good at working in larger groups, such as the Eika group 
and Sparebank1 group, creating possibilities for economies of scale. Shared procurement, 
services, product development, competence development, and information technology 
development are contributors to this, to mention a few.  
The Eika group have 74 savings banks and all banks appear with their own online and mobile 
banking sites, but it is only the design and some content delivery that are different. Essentially, all 
applications are exactly alike and this means that the new innovative solutions, like a payment 
application, can be used by 74 savings banks for the same cost.  
Eika is also the largest shareholder in a Danish data centre and share development costs with 
banks from Denmark, Sweden and the Faroe Islands. 
3. The large bank cooperation in Norway 
The most important reason has been the large banking cooperation in Norway. Both savings banks 
and the former major commercial banks have a long tradition of public joint infrastructure 
development solutions. Infrastructure developments as joint cards solutions, ATMs, payment 
terminals in stores, eGiro, e-invoice, direct debits, debits and bankID to mention a few. For all 
these solutions, banks have shared costs and thus avoided creating their own solutions. In other 
countries, for example Sweden, banks have less cooperation on innovations and thus each bank 
had to build their own solutions in these areas. In Greece or Turkey you can find four or five 
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different payment terminals in stores. Or as in the US where they have not found national digital 
solutions and thus still operate with both giros and checks. 
Norwegian banks have thus been able to develop one of the cheapest payment systems in the 
world, BankAxept, and one of the most efficient identity services “BankID”, which everyone has 
access to. 
7.4.1 Summary 
After this analysis of the answers from Eika group, is it clear that Norwegian savings banks have 
achieved their low cost structure from both domestic cooperation and alliances. Domestic 
cooperation between the banks in Norway has led to big developments in the banking 
infrastructure. While the alliances within the banks have created shared development costs of 
technology. This is an answer to our research question about how Norwegian savings banks have 
created such a low cost structure. Further discussion on the fourth hypothesis will continue in 
section 8.3. 
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8 Discussion 
In this part of the thesis we will discuss what might be the cause of the difference between MFIs 
and Norwegian savings banks. We will also answer the fourth hypothesis where we look at the 
developments of the two markets to see what developments that are transferable and applicable 
for MFIs.  
8.1 Age 
For this thesis, we challenge the claim that age makes MFIs more cost efficient. There have been 
several studies where this relationship has been tested and some answers are ambiguous. Caudill 
et al. (2009) found that in East Europe and Central Asia, half of the MFIs were getting more 
efficient with age and the other half were not. However, Rosenberg et al. (2009) found that age 
affects the operational expenses by reduction in costs, but the effect weakened over time. From 
our regression, using fixed effects, we find that there is no significant relation between age and 
operational expenses. The dataset yields 925 and 1,029 observations for our two regression 
analyses, which we consider to be sufficient to not support our hypothesis that there is a relation 
between age and operational expenses.  
Caudill et al. (2009) said that East Europe and Central Asia region were among the youngest in 
the microfinance industry and their MFIs were on average 5.57 years old. In our dataset however, 
the average age is twice the size at 11.39. Moreover, they had 137 observations for their age 
variable while our variable consists of 2,197 observations where 925 are included in the 
regression after all missing values were eliminated. Our data also include additional regions and 
therefore covers a wider spectre of the industry. This might be one explanation for why the 
regression results differs from the findings from Caudill et al. (2009), where for around half of 
their sample, age was statistically significant. Another explanation can be that they used the 
period 2003 to 2004, two years, while we use 1999 to 2011. 
Rosenberg et al. (2009) said that age was highly significant in their regression. They used the 
period from 2003 to 2006 and their data were collected from Microfinance Information 
Exchange’s database. Moreover, they weighted their variables on the Gross Loan Portfolio. On 
the other hand, our data is from the ‘Mersland dataset’ and for the period 1999 to 2011 and are 
weighted on total assets or not weighted at all. Some of the differences in the regression results 
might be explained due to this. Rosenberg et al. (2009) also eliminated all MFIs receiving any 
form of subsidies, where we include these banks in our sample. This will affect the results and can 
be a major factor for why our results differs from Rosenberg et al. (2009). The weaknesses this 
approach can pose, are further discussed in section 9.1. 
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The analyses for hypotheses one and two finds that MFIs are becoming more efficient with time, 
however, there is no significant relation between age and operational expenses. This support the 
first hypothesis, however, we cannot support the second. It can be argued that MFIs become 
efficient with time due to learning effects and that they make their operations more streamlined as 
a result of experience. One can say that this also relates to the age of the MFIs, but we want to 
look a little further than this. Rosenberg et al. (2009) found that economies of scale decrease as an 
MFI reaches 2,000 borrowers and that they have a diminishing marginal growth, meaning the 
growth subsides with time. We believe that MFIs have a steep learning curve in their early years 
but as they learn how to streamline their operations, they reach a limit for this learning curve. This 
implies that as they learn how to service and maintain loans more efficiently, without 
technological improvements their growth stagnates and the benefits of economies of scale 
decreases. As this technological limitation keeps them from further improve their efficiency, we 
argue that this might be an explanation for why age do not affect operational expenses.  
8.2 Comparison  
The differences between MFIs and Norwegian savings banks seems to be naturally reflected by 
how far they have come in their market development. One can argue that Norwegian savings 
banks are in the mature phase, based on the areas in which they are competing, the reduction of 
branches and employees and the development discussed in part 3.8 and our findings in part 7.4. 
Norwegian savings banks are competing on elements such as prices and branding where the 
competitive strategy is demand driven, which include responding to their clients’ needs. They are 
one of the most cost-efficient banks in the world and still manage to reduce costs and be even 
more efficient. This may be a result of what the two industries are primarily focusing on, which is 
a natural result of their current market development phase. MFIs are in the take-off phase 
(Mersland & Strøm, 2012b), were they are competing on product characteristics and service levels 
(Porteous, 2006). They have minor focus on prices and customers’ needs and focus more on 
creating new lending methodologies, which is done through trial and error. Additionally, there is a 
social mission as well as a financial mission in microfinance (Mersland & Strøm, 2014). The 
social mission can be measured by the depth of outreach (Schreiner, 2002), which stated that the 
smaller the loan the broader the outreach. This does not enable MFIs to focus particularly on 
reducing costs. These industry differences in market phases may explain the differences between 
them rather well.  
Hermes et al. (2009) found strong evidence that there exists a positive relationship between MFIs 
efficiency and domestic financial development. From the financial development index from 2012, 
Norway had a higher rank than all countries in our microfinance dataset (World Economic 
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Forum). The list of the countries where the MFIs operate are listed in appendix A1. Additionally, 
we explained in section 3.8 and 7.3 what developments that have happened in Norway, and the 
importance of the domestic cooperation between banks and alliances, which have contributed to 
the low cost structure for savings banks. While cooperation and alliances have been very 
important for Norwegian savings banks, Caudill et al. (2009) found that MFIs that where not in 
international networks tended to improve cost reductions. These differences also explain why 
MFIs differs from Norwegian savings banks.  
When looking at some of the ratios, they indicate that MFIs have enhanced their performance. 
Return on assets has increased, and it has a higher yield than Norwegian savings banks. The MFIs 
assets have increased during the period, which may be a result of the high growth in the market, 
which indicates an increase in net income.  
The banks main revenues are net financial revenue, and it is more or less constant as seen in 
figure 10. MFIs have a very weak, downward trend over the period, while Norwegian savings 
banks have a stronger downward trend. This might demonstrate that the competition in 
microfinance is not on prices, whereas competition in Norway leads to decreasing net financial 
revenue as a result of being in a competitive market. Let us look at the different factors of the 
ratio, starting with the financial revenues. In total the interest yield is declining, which makes the 
revenue decline, ceteris paribus. However, loan portfolio is increasing substantially, making the 
total financial revenue increase. Furthermore, the financial expenses also increase for MFIs. The 
fact that financial expenses are growing may imply that fewer MFIs are funded with subsidies or 
that there are more deposits from consumers. Caudill et al. (2009) found that MFIs who were less 
dependent on subsidies were associated with operating more cost effectively over time. 
The operating self-sufficiency measure has a positive trend, and above 100% almost the entire 
period, which indicating that MFIs do not rely on subsidies. It could be argued that Cost Income 
Ratio might possibly be a better ratio for MFIs in the future, since CIR analyse how costs change 
in relation to revenue. It may be a better measure to analyse how costs change compared to 
revenue when operating in an industry with high operational expenses. We can clearly see a 
declining trend in CIR, which is positive even though the costs are still significantly high. The 
reduction in CIR may explain the reducing operational expenses. 
Lastly, looking at possibly one of the most important factors in microfinance, operational 
expenses, which is the largest determinant of the interest yield (Hug, 2014; Rosenberg et al., 
2013). There is a reduction in operational expenses in percent of total assets as seen in figure 8. 
One part of the reduction in microfinance can be argued comes from learning- and experience 
effects. However, it can be further argued that the MFIs have reached their maximum learning 
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effect under their current conditions. As there can be a limit to how streamlined they can make 
their operations without a larger technological development of their services. Rosenberg et al. 
(2009) found that microfinance achieve minor benefits from economies of scale and that they 
captured all benefits from economies of scale by the time they reached 2,000 clients. This is a 
result of MFIs only having small fixed assets and large variable costs. The findings from 
Hartarska et al. (2013) also indicated very little benefit from economies of scale, their results 
showed that serving more clients is more expensive than serving larger clients. On the other hand, 
Bjørnenak (2013) found that there exist economies of scale for banking sector in Norway. This 
helps to explain the large differences in operational expenses. Recent developments in 
technologies may also have reduced the operational expenses and improved efficiencies. Hermes 
et al. (2011) mentioned the new banking technologies such as charge cards, ATMs, cell phones 
and Internet banking had begun entering the microfinance industry, helping reduce costs and the 
delivery of services. From figure 3, we can clearly see differences from using a teller instead of 
ATMs or internet/mobile banking in terms of transaction costs. E.g. the need for employees for 
non-profit activities reduces. Measuring the effect of technology is difficult when we study the 
industry as a whole. 
8.3 Innovation 
In microfinance the “discovery” of group lending was perceived to be the biggest and most 
important innovation (Armendáriz & Morduch, 2010). This in itself enhances the claim from 
Morduch (1999) that we are waiting for the next wave. Mersland and Strøm (2012b) claimed that 
some of the early innovations lost their importance, as other innovations were getting more 
important. As the individual loans were becoming more common at the expense of the group 
loans, they made the claim that instead of a new wave, the expansion of already implemented and 
functional innovations were needed. Through the statistical analysis of this thesis, we have put 
forth results stating that the age of the MFIs do not mean that they are more cost efficient. We 
have compared the MFIs with the Norwegian savings banks and even though at an already low 
level of cost the Norwegian savings banks are able to achieve a higher reduction in costs than 
MFIs. The MFIs faces challenges regarding the repayment of loans. The innovations of targeting 
women and issuing group loans was one way to improve the repayment rate and reduce the 
asymmetric information when credit scoring customers. 
Now tough, MFIs are faced with high operational expenses that contributes to a high interest yield 
for their loans. This makes it harder for the borrowers to repay the loans since they sometimes pay 
half the loan amount in interests. Mersland and Strøm (2010a) stated that the cost of maintaining 
group loans excided the benefits of these loan methods. With group loans they meet regularly to 
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collect the payments and if borrowers are not able to pay, the group must find a way to do so. This 
takes time and can be labour-intensive. Mersland and Strøm (2012b) also said that the group loans 
were not needed to uphold the repayment rate. As this being the bases for issuing group loans, 
these previous studies and the results from our regression all point toward group loan no longer 
being an efficient loan methodology in today’s market place.  
Haare and Solheim (2012) said that, in the start of the 1990s, Norway also had several systems 
with different technology, which brought high fixed costs for the banks. BankAxept was 
implemented in the end of 1991, joining all systems in to one and was fully operational in 1995. 
The domestic cooperation between banks in Norway has contributed to the low cost for savings 
banks. This because of the joint development of banking applications and systems where the 
banks shared the development costs. The banks run on the same system making all banking 
customers able use the same bank terminals and can withdraw from all ATMs. This increased the 
availability at the same time it lowered the cost per customer reached. We mentioned the Eika 
group, an alliance consisting of 74 banks where they share most of the development costs for their 
technological services. Caudill et al. (2009) found that MFIs that were not in any international 
networks tended to improve their efficiency. Being a part of an international network might not 
benefit the MFIs due to the lack of domestic applicability of the technological solutions they offer. 
As documented, the Norwegian banking industry has managed to create stabile and effective 
domestic networks, which are beneficial to all participants. MFIs must cooperate among 
themselves or with their domestic government in an effort to create better solutions customized 
for their culture. 
ResponsAbility (2016) mentioned in their market outlook that of the experts interviewed, the 
majority said that technology is the way to revolutionize microfinance. Most of the experts said 
that branchless banking and mobile money are the major innovations that will affect microfinance 
in the future.  
Norwegian savings banks have been practicing partly branchless banking ever since Internet 
banking was introduced in 1996 and commercialized in 2000. As mentioned earlier, they have 
through their joint development made these services efficient and productive, reaching many 
borrowers. Through cooperation, MFIs can limit the costs of developing mobile systems for 
repaying loans, transactions and other services. By forming alliances, such as Eika, more banks, 
and new banks, can get access to technology that are already developed and implemented for a fee 
that are way below the cost of developing these systems by oneself. 
When it comes to the implementation of banking technologies, Bergo (2000) in a report for 
Norges bank emphasized that there exists no automatic link between technology and increased 
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efficiency. Efficiency is created through the interaction between technology, institutions and 
users. Thereafter, they mention three conditions that need to be in place to get an increased 
efficiency through the usage of new technology. Firstly, the users of the system must be able to 
take advantage of the new technology. Secondly, customers must have an easy and inexpensive 
access to the new technology. And lastly, and perhaps the most important, the technology must 
encourage cost-efficient use of these technologies. The users must be given the correct prices and 
incentives so that their payment habits can change in the right direction (Bergo, 2000). We are 
analysing 473 different MFIs in 77 different countries, which makes it difficult to recommend any 
specific technological features. We rather recommend that MFIs consider the assumptions 
mentioned by Bergo (2000) when starting to implement new technologies. 
Obviously, there are differences between countries both financially and culturally. The 
assumptions Bergo (2000) presented for efficiently adapting new technologies are intended for the 
Norwegian market. This means that this might not be applicable for other countries due to 
developmental differences. However, the success of the technological development in the 
Norwegian banking industry shows that they have done something right. MFIs should try to 
replicate them to the extent that is possible given their current technological development. 
The discussion presented in this section supports the fourth hypothesis that MFIs can learn from 
Norwegian savings banks.  
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9 Conclusion 
The objective of this thesis has been to research and identify possibilities for microfinance 
institutions to be more efficient by learning from Norwegian savings banks. We have done this by 
studying 473 microfinance institutions from 77 different countries in the period 1998 to 2012 and 
81 Norwegian savings banks from the period 1995 to 2015. Based on this we have tested if MFIs 
are becoming more efficient with time, with respect to operational expenses. Microfinance 
institutions statically reduced operational expenses in percent of total assets, which implies that 
MFIs are becoming more efficient with time. This supports our hypothesis that MFIs are 
becoming more efficient with time. We then performed a panel regression to test whether age of 
an MFI had an effect on (1) operational expenses and (2) portfolio yield. Both regressions indicate 
that age does not affect operational expenses, which did not support our hypothesis that age affect 
operational expenses. We compared the industries financial statements and ratios to test if there 
exist differences. We found that, for MFIs, financial revenues, financial expenses and operational 
expenses constitute the largest items in the financial statement. In general, all ratios illustrated 
more stability for Norwegian banks, while MFIs were converging towards Norwegian savings 
banks. T-tests were conducted for all accounting numbers and ratios to test the differences in the 
means. The results of the t-tests indicate that there were significant difference between the MFIs 
and the Norwegian savings banks. Lastly, we looked at what actions have been done in Norway to 
create the low cost structure. Our results from talking with key personnel were domestic 
cooperation between banks, alliances within banks and technology. 
The differences seem to naturally reflect the market developments phases and the fact that MFIs 
have a focus on social mission together with a financial mission. What microfinance can learn 
from Norwegian savings banks seems to not be straightforward. Technology together with 
domestic cooperation and alliances seems to have led to the largest improvements for the 
Norwegian savings banks’ low cost structure. We believe that it is not accurate to recommend a 
specific technology, but rather that MFIs should consider the assumptions mentioned earlier for 
implementing technologies. Moreover, we consider that domestic cooperation and alliances can 
be an element MFIs can utilize when starting to use more and more technology. Through 
cooperation, MFIs can share development cost among several participants. International networks 
have not seemed to work, so domestic alliances can be more applicable for MFIs. 
9.1 Weaknesses 
This part will outline the aspects of our analyses that we believe were not optimal and leads to 
weaknesses in these analyses. 
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When working with the MFI dataset, we did not balance it as we did for the Norwegian savings 
banks dataset. For our regressions, this yielded 3.4 observations per year for (1) operational 
expenses and 3.9 for (2) portfolio yield. For the first regression, we had at most nine observations 
per year and ten for the latter. With a more balanced dataset we would sacrificed some 
observations but then again we would have more observations per year.  
In the regression analyses, we did no corrections for multicollinearity. The correlation matrixes 
for both regressions, found in appendix A10, shows that for (1) operational expenses, personnel 
productivity and average loan have a correlation of 0.3151. Furthermore, for (2) portfolio yield, 
size and age have a correlation of 0.3117. However, we consider the correlation of these variables 
to be acceptable. The rule of thumb is that all variables with a correlation higher than 0.70 
indicates the presence of multicollinearity (Sekaran & Bougie, 2013). Even though none of our 
variables have a higher correlation than 0.70, all variables above 0.30 should be investigated 
further. As this has not been done, it poses as a weakness for our analyses.  
Some MFIs receive subsidies and revenue may therefore be lower than their expenses. In effect, 
they avoid bankruptcy while still recording losses contributing to the industry looking less 
profitable than it really is. The fact that these MFIs are not removed from the dataset affects the 
means for our descriptive analysis as well as the results from the regression analysis, and might 
pose a considerable weakness for our study.  
We speculate that the lack of technological development might explain why age is not significant 
in our regressions. The MFI dataset did not provide any statistics for the technological 
development for the country in which a particular MFI operate. Statistics of this nature can be 
found online, however, due to time constraints we elected not to search for this information. To 
further control for this, we used one country specific variable. GDP per Capita captures the 
economic growth of a country, however, it is hard to extract any noteworthy data for 
technological development from this variable. To strengthen the regressions, we should have 
included more variables to control for this.  
9.2 Further Study 
There is a need for more technology studies to better understand how technological development 
can influence efficiency for MFIs. Also, there is a lack of studies looking at MFIs efficiency and 
how the cost drivers can be used to improve efficiency. Mersland and Strøm (2014) studied how 
to measure microfinance however there is still a need for studies comparing microfinance to other 
banking industries so we can better understand, and identify, areas where the microfinance 
“model” can improve. Some books have summarized the history of Norwegian savings banks, but 
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there has not been identified what specific technological innovations that had the largest impact. 
We also found that there is a lack of studies analysing one of the world’s most efficient banking 
sector, and identifying how other industries can learn from them. 
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Appendices 
A1 Country list for MFIs 
 
  
Code Country
Number 
of Banks
Code Country
Number of 
Banks
Code Country
Number 
of Banks
Code Country
Number 
of Banks
1 Albania 3 21 Honduras 9 41 South Africa 3 61 Chad 1
2 Argentina 2 22 India 32 42 Sri Lanka 2 62 Rwanda 5
3 Armenia 4 23 Indonesia 4 43 Tanzania 8 63 Zambia 3
4 Benin 8 24 Jordan 3 44 Togo 4 64 China 5
5 Bolivia 15 25 Kazakhstan 4 45
Trinidad and 
Tobago
1 65 Serbia
1
6
Bosnia 
Hercegovina
12 26 Kenya 12 46 Tunisia 1 66 Ghana
5
7 Brazil 14 27 Kyrgyzstan 5 47 Uganda 14 67 Malawi 1
8 Bulgaria 2 28 Madagascar 3 48 Montenegro 2 68 Gambia 1
9 Burkina Faso 4 29 Mali 5 49 Cameroun 5 69 Kosovo 4
10 Cambodia 14 30 Mexico 21 50 Guinee 1 70
Rep of 
CongoBrazz 1
11 Chile 2 31 Moldova 2 51 East Timor 1 71 Burundi 1
12 Colombia 9 32 Morocco 7 52 Bangladesh 2 72 Niger 5
13
Dominican 
Republic
5 33 Nicaragua 14 53 Nepal 5 73
DRC - 
Kinshasa 1
14 Ecuador 18 34 Pakistan 1 54 Vietnam 3 74 Afghanistan 1
15 Egypt 5 35 Paraguay 2 55 Azerbaijan 8 75 Costa Rica 1
16 El Salvador 6 36 Peru 39 56 Mongolia 2 76 Lebanon 2
17 Ethiopia 10 37 Philippines 15 57 Nigeria 5 77 Turkey 1
18 Georgia 7 38 Romania 1 58 Mozambique 1
19 Guatemela 8 39
Russian 
Federation
15 59 Tajikistan 9
20 Haiti 3 40 Senegal 11 60 Croatia 1
Country codes for MFIs
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A2 Transformation of total assets variable 
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A3 Hausman test for operating expenses and portfolio yield 
 
  
(b) (B) (b) - (B) sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
Variables FE Operational exp RE Operational exp Difference Std. Error
Age -0.0045889 -0.0042205 -0.0003684 0.0018025
Average Loan -6.95E-06 -0.0000197 0.0000128 3.69E-06
Personnel Productivity -0.000422 -4.52E-04 0.0000297 0.0000574
GDP per Capita -2.58E-05 -8.44E-06 -0.0000173 3.56E-06
Village Loan (dummy) 0.1287936 0.0967159 0.0320776 0.0743653
Solidarity Group (dummy) -0.0024419 0.0750952 -0.0775372 0.0813808
chi2(4) =
=
Prob>chi2 =
(b) (B) (b) - (B) sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
Variables FE Portfolio Yield RE Portfolio Yield Difference Std. Error
Age 0.0030705 -0.0027963 0.0058667 0.0026353
Size -0.0311682 -0.0202379 -0.0109303 0.0065875
Average Loan -6.94E-06 -0.000019 0.0000121 3.48E-06
Personnel Productivity 0.0000535 -3.62E-06 0.0000571 0.0000167
GDP per Capita -3.13E-06 0.0000105 -0.0000136 3.75E-06
Village Loan (dummy) 0.0278563 0.0511106 -0.0232543 0.0825744
Solidarity Group (dummy) -0.0770906 0.054554 -0.1316446 0.0765874
chi2(5) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
= 17.82
Prob>chi2 = 0.0032
Coefficients
Coefficients
B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
1.33
0.8568
B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
(b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
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A4 Regression output for operating expenses in percent of total assets 
 
  
= 925
= 269
R-sq:
within = 0.2051 min = 1
between = 0.0105 avg = 3.4
overall = 0.0389 max = 9
=
= -0.4114 =
Robust 
Std. Err. t P>|t|
0.0031891 -1.38 0.168 0.0018282
0.00000498 -1.49 0.137 0.00000238
0.0001184 -3.59 0.000 -0.0001914
0.0000144 -1.81 0.072 0.00000232
0.0082401 15.72 0.000 0.1457366
0.0136257 -0.23 0.816 0.0236474
0.0320431 11.31 0.000 0.4254583
= 925
= 269
R-sq:
within = 0.1774 min = 1
between = 0.1157 avg = 3.4
overall = 0.1648 max = 9
= 89.14
= 0 (assumed) = 0.0000
Robust 
Std. Err. z P>|z|
0.0009613 -4.39 0.000 -0.0023364
3.48E-06 -5.66 0.000 -0.0000129
0.0000816 -5.54 0.000 -0.0002918
6.38E-06 -1.32 0.186 4.08E-06
0.0253264 3.82 0.000 0.1463549
0.0199328 3.77 0.000 0.1141628
0.0315567 10.04 0.000 0.3786680
Random-effects GLS regression Number of obs
Wald chi2(6)
Average Loan
Personnel Productivity
Village Loan (dummy)
Solidarity Group (dummy)
     Coef.
(fraction of variance due to u_i)
Operational Expenses % 
of Total Assets [95% Conf. Interval]
Age
GDP per Capita -0.000026
0.36237
Fixed-effects (within) regression Number of obs
Group variable: BANKS Number of groups
Obs per group:
F(5,266)
corr(u_i, Xb) Prob > F
(Std. Err. adjusted for 269 clusters in BANKS)
-0.0000543
0.1295131 0.1132895
-0.0031796 -0.0300066
-0.0104645
-0.00000742 -0.0000172
-0.0004245 -0.0006576
-0.0045889
0.2992817Intercept
0.15157486
sigma_e 0.06691728
sigma_u
rho 0.83688687
GDP per Capita -8.44E-06 -0.0000209
corr(u_i, X) Prob > F
Group variable: BANKS Number of groups
Obs per group:
Village Loan (dummy) 0.0967159 0.0470770
Average Loan -0.0000197 -0.0000265
sigma_u 0.11548032
sigma_e 0.06697891
Solidarity Group (dummy) 0.0750952 0.0360277
Intercept 0.3168181 0.2549681
Personnel Productivity -0.0004516
(Std. Err. adjusted for 269 clusters in BANKS)
[95% Conf. Interval]
rho 0.74827711 (fraction of variance due to u_i)
-0.0006115
Operational Expenses % 
of Total Assets      Coef.
Age -0.0042205 -0.0061047
  
71 
A5 Regression output for portfolio yield 
 
  
= 1,029
= 267
R-sq:
within = 0.0597 min = 1
between = 0.0047 avg = 3.9
overall = 0.0007 max = 10
=
= -0.3254 =
Robust 
Std. Err. t P>|t|
0.0040062 0.77 0.444 0.0109584
0.0150275 -2.07 0.039 -0.0015803
8.92E-06 -0.78 0.437 1.06E-05
0.000041 1.30 0.193 0.0001343
7.16E-06 -0.44 0.663 0.000011
0.0122815 2.27 0.024 0.0520375
0.0250814 -3.07 0.002 -0.0277074
0.1951949 4.31 0.000 1.225952
= 1,029
= 267
R-sq:
within = 0.0377 min = 1
between = 0.1713 avg = 3.9
overall = 0.2067 max = 10
= 46.53
= 0 (assumed) = 0.0000
Robust 
Std. Err. z P>|z|
0.001227 -2.28 0.023 -0.0003913
0.0085426 -2.37 0.018 -0.0034947
6.74E-06 -2.82 0.005 -5.80E-06
0.0000402 -0.09 0.928 0.0000751
4.24E-06 2.47 0.013 0.0000188
0.0302253 1.69 0.091 0.1103512
0.0263009 2.07 0.038 0.1061028
0.1230586 5.55 0.000 0.9236863
(fraction of variance due to u_i)
Intercept 0.6824959
     Coef.
2.18E-06
-0.0000824
0.0030051
-0.00813
-0.0369811
-0.0000322
Portfolio Yield      Coef.
sigma_e 0.07777559
rho 0.7920295
Personnel Productivity -3.62E-06
GDP per Capita 0.0000105
Size -0.0202379
Average Loan -0.000019
0.4413056
sigma_u 0.1517795
Village Loan (dummy) 0.0511106
Solidarity Group (dummy) 0.054554
Random-effects GLS regression Number of obs
Group variable: BANKS Number of groups
Obs per group:
(Std. Err. adjusted for 267 clusters in BANKS)
[95% Conf. Interval]
Age -0.0027963 -0.0052012
(fraction of variance due to u_i)
0.1922148
0.07777559sigma_e
(Std. Err. adjusted for 267 clusters in BANKS)
[95% Conf. Interval]
Number of obs
Number of groups
Obs per group:
F(5,266)
Prob > Fcorr(u_i, Xb)
sigma_u
Portfolio Yield
Personnel Productivity
GDP per Capita
Village Loan (dummy)
Solidarity Group (dummy)
Intercept
0.0036751
-0.1264739
Fixed-effects (within) regression
Group variable: BANKS
Age
Size
Average Loan
0.0030705
-0.0311682
0.4573048
0.0000535
-3.13E-06
0.0278563
-0.0770906
0.8416284
-0.0048175
-0.0607561
-0.0000245
-0.0000273
-0.0000172
-6.94E-06
corr(u_i, X) Prob > F
Wald chi2(7)
0.85931011rho
  
72 
A6 Overview of the regression results with both fixed effects and random effects 
 
  
Age -0.00458891 0.00307048 -0.00422054 *** -0.00279626 **
(0.00318912) (0.00400623) (0.00096132) (0.00122704)
Average Loan -6.954E-06 -6.941E-06 -0.00001971 *** -0.00001901 ***
(4.986E-06) (8.923E-06) (3.481E-06) 6.740E-06
Personnel Productivity -0.00042199 *** 0.0000535 -0.00045164 *** (-3.621E-06)
(0.00011848) (0.00004103) (0.00008156) (0.00004018)
GDP per Capita -0.00002576 * -3.126E-06 -8.436E-06 0.00001048 **
(0.00001441) (7.158E-06) (6.384E-06) (4.235E-06)
Village Loan (dummy) 0.12879357 *** 0.0278563 ** 0.09671594 *** 0.05111061 *
(0.00841189) (0.01228145) (0.02532645) (0.03022535)
Solidarity Group (dummy) -0.00244192 -0.07709062 *** 0.07509525 *** 0.05455398 **
(0.0136257) (0.02508136) (0.01993278) (0.02630092)
Size -0.03116815 ** -0.0202379 **
(0.01502746) (0.00854259)
Intercept 0.36384569 *** 0.84162844 *** 0.31681808 *** 0.68249592 ***
(0.03228197) (0.19519495) (0.03155667) (0.12305856)
Observations 925 1029 925 1029
R-squared 0.20509547 0.0596706 0.16482955 0.20666281
Fixed Effects Model Random Effects Model
Operational Expenses Portfolio Yield Operational Expenses Portfolio Yield
(1) and (2) are regressed using operational expenses and portfolio yield as the dependent variables and utilizing fixed effects model. 
(3) and (4) are regressed using operational expenses and portfolio yield as the dependent variables and utilizing random effects model.
Operational expenses are divided by total assets, which is the reason for size not being included in (1) and (3).
Village Loan (dummy) states whether the MFIs provide loans to groups consisting of a whole village.
Solidarity Group (dummy) states whether the MFIs provide loans to smaller groups
The size variable is the ln of total assets.
Robust standard errors in parenthesis; Statistical significance: * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
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A7 Detailed descriptive analysis for Norwegian savings banks 
 
 Years 
Financial 
Revenue
Financial 
expenses
Net 
Financial 
Revenue
Loan loss 
provisions
Financial 
Margin
Operational 
expenses CIR Total assets
Total 
Portfolio
1995 7.9973 3.8146 4.1828 1.8858 2.2969 2.8054 0.5681 104.1872 90.2012
1996 7.9671 3.8602 4.1069 1.8402 2.2668 2.8119 0.5882 112.6548 99.9036
1997 6.6917 2.9526 3.7391 1.6080 2.1312 2.6456 0.5781 112.9929 102.7818
1998 8.2015 4.3110 3.8905 1.6017 2.2888 2.5915 0.6036 117.3445 107.6590
1999 10.0932 5.8763 4.2170 1.7099 2.5071 2.7570 0.5409 128.3207 119.9959
2000 9.9371 5.9135 4.0236 1.8268 2.1969 2.6960 0.5572 131.5195 123.6208
2001 12.2770 7.9557 4.3213 2.0095 2.3117 2.8103 0.5822 146.8048 137.4920
2002 15.1200 9.7991 5.3209 2.5218 2.7991 3.4187 0.6068 185.2859 173.9192
2003 14.7025 8.5280 6.1746 3.0768 3.0978 4.1001 0.5430 232.5893 221.0229
2004 11.3616 4.6234 6.7382 3.3205 3.4176 4.5373 0.5403 275.2242 262.0868
2005 13.0123 5.6758 7.3365 3.1492 4.1874 5.2179 0.5803 322.6810 303.2919
2006 16.8006 8.8968 7.9039 2.2767 5.6272 5.6697 0.5798 365.8204 345.9260
2007 26.9629 17.2765 9.6864 2.1451 7.5413 6.8874 0.5970 464.3322 434.4475
2008 42.0630 30.1545 11.9085 4.0260 7.8826 8.3241 0.6766 579.4048 515.2401
2009 26.3649 16.5511 9.8138 4.1456 5.6681 7.5356 0.5698 551.2141 462.1577
2010 25.4413 14.8641 10.5772 4.5366 6.0406 7.5579 0.5225 613.4770 500.7053
2011 28.9422 17.2746 11.6676 5.1848 6.4828 9.0374 0.6078 669.3748 546.0529
2012 28.5553 16.8853 11.6700 4.9610 6.7091 9.2303 0.5840 668.5876 555.9873
2013 28.7499 16.5889 12.1610 4.6448 7.5162 9.4228 0.5548 693.4983 569.1842
2014 27.2941 15.3916 11.9025 4.3252 7.5773 9.2989 0.5596 678.2967 558.4831
Mean 18.4268 10.8597 7.5671 3.0398 4.5273 5.4678 0.5770 357.6805 311.5080
 Years 
Financial 
Revenue
Financial 
expenses
Net 
Financial 
Revenue
Loan loss 
provisions
Financial 
Margin
Operational 
expenses CIR Total assets
Total 
Portfolio
1995 100.00 % 46.94 % 53.06 % 24.32 % 28.74 % 35.13 % 0.5681 1296.21 % 1112.97 %
1996 100.00 % 47.98 % 52.02 % 23.18 % 28.85 % 35.39 % 0.5882 1402.50 % 1226.42 %
1997 100.00 % 43.55 % 56.45 % 24.97 % 31.48 % 39.46 % 0.5781 1666.25 % 1491.01 %
1998 100.00 % 51.41 % 48.59 % 21.26 % 27.33 % 32.52 % 0.6036 1423.79 % 1288.21 %
1999 100.00 % 56.66 % 43.34 % 18.70 % 24.64 % 28.22 % 0.5409 1261.30 % 1153.37 %
2000 100.00 % 57.12 % 42.88 % 20.66 % 22.21 % 27.87 % 0.5572 1314.54 % 1216.60 %
2001 100.00 % 62.51 % 37.49 % 18.59 % 18.90 % 24.10 % 0.5822 1193.84 % 1101.06 %
2002 100.00 % 62.34 % 37.66 % 19.13 % 18.53 % 24.36 % 0.6068 1226.12 % 1135.04 %
2003 100.00 % 55.25 % 44.75 % 23.66 % 21.09 % 29.73 % 0.5430 1568.15 % 1459.61 %
2004 100.00 % 36.45 % 63.55 % 33.91 % 29.64 % 42.88 % 0.5403 2382.84 % 2228.96 %
2005 100.00 % 37.81 % 62.19 % 30.66 % 31.53 % 45.66 % 0.5803 2504.33 % 2336.74 %
2006 100.00 % 46.43 % 53.57 % 18.64 % 34.93 % 39.78 % 0.5798 2260.06 % 2118.95 %
2007 100.00 % 59.04 % 40.96 % 11.32 % 29.63 % 29.51 % 0.5970 1765.44 % 1657.12 %
2008 100.00 % 67.52 % 32.48 % 11.39 % 21.08 % 22.37 % 0.6766 1406.96 % 1256.60 %
2009 100.00 % 58.00 % 42.00 % 18.05 % 23.95 % 32.06 % 0.5698 2142.66 % 1830.56 %
2010 100.00 % 54.78 % 45.22 % 18.17 % 27.05 % 31.49 % 0.5225 2396.92 % 1990.09 %
2011 100.00 % 56.47 % 43.53 % 19.29 % 24.24 % 33.18 % 0.6078 2277.14 % 1909.24 %
2012 100.00 % 56.14 % 43.86 % 18.10 % 25.76 % 34.25 % 0.5840 2283.60 % 1946.70 %
2013 100.00 % 55.21 % 44.79 % 17.17 % 27.62 % 35.42 % 0.5548 2348.88 % 1983.12 %
2014 100.00 % 54.31 % 45.69 % 16.44 % 29.25 % 36.40 % 0.5596 2423.28 % 2027.90 %
Mean 100.00 % 53.30 % 46.70 % 20.38 % 26.32 % 32.99 % 0.5770 1827.24 % 1623.51 %
Norwegian savings banks
As a percentage of financial revenues for Norwegian savings banks
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 Years 
Financial 
Revenue
Financial 
expenses
Net 
Financial 
Revenue
Loan loss 
provisions
Financial 
Margin
Operational 
expenses CIR Total assets
Total 
Portfolio
1995 7.74 % 3.63 % 4.11 % 1.90 % 2.21 % 2.72 % 0.5681 100.00 % 85.97 %
1996 7.15 % 3.43 % 3.73 % 1.67 % 2.06 % 2.53 % 0.5882 100.00 % 87.61 %
1997 6.03 % 2.62 % 3.41 % 1.51 % 1.90 % 2.37 % 0.5781 100.00 % 89.57 %
1998 7.05 % 3.62 % 3.43 % 1.50 % 1.93 % 2.29 % 0.6036 100.00 % 90.68 %
1999 7.95 % 4.50 % 3.45 % 1.50 % 1.95 % 2.24 % 0.5409 100.00 % 91.57 %
2000 7.63 % 4.35 % 3.27 % 1.58 % 1.69 % 2.13 % 0.5572 100.00 % 92.65 %
2001 8.39 % 5.25 % 3.15 % 1.56 % 1.58 % 2.02 % 0.5822 100.00 % 92.29 %
2002 8.17 % 5.09 % 3.08 % 1.57 % 1.51 % 1.99 % 0.6068 100.00 % 92.62 %
2003 6.40 % 3.53 % 2.87 % 1.52 % 1.35 % 1.90 % 0.5430 100.00 % 93.12 %
2004 4.23 % 1.54 % 2.70 % 1.44 % 1.26 % 1.81 % 0.5403 100.00 % 93.57 %
2005 4.02 % 1.52 % 2.50 % 1.23 % 1.27 % 1.83 % 0.5803 100.00 % 93.38 %
2006 4.46 % 2.07 % 2.38 % 0.83 % 1.55 % 1.76 % 0.5798 100.00 % 93.82 %
2007 5.69 % 3.36 % 2.33 % 0.64 % 1.68 % 1.68 % 0.5970 100.00 % 93.89 %
2008 7.13 % 4.81 % 2.31 % 0.82 % 1.50 % 1.59 % 0.6766 100.00 % 89.32 %
2009 4.70 % 2.73 % 1.97 % 0.85 % 1.13 % 1.50 % 0.5698 100.00 % 85.41 %
2010 4.21 % 2.31 % 1.90 % 0.76 % 1.14 % 1.32 % 0.5225 100.00 % 83.01 %
2011 4.42 % 2.49 % 1.93 % 0.85 % 1.08 % 1.46 % 0.6078 100.00 % 83.88 %
2012 4.40 % 2.47 % 1.93 % 0.80 % 1.14 % 1.50 % 0.5840 100.00 % 85.32 %
2013 4.28 % 2.36 % 1.92 % 0.73 % 1.19 % 1.51 % 0.5548 100.00 % 84.57 %
2014 4.14 % 2.25 % 1.90 % 0.69 % 1.21 % 1.51 % 0.5596 100.00 % 83.77 %
Mean 5.91 % 3.20 % 2.71 % 1.20 % 1.52 % 1.88 % 0.5770 100.00 % 89.30 %
As a percentage of total assets for Norwegian savings banks
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A8 Detailed descriptive analysis for MFIs 
The averages for each year and the total averages do not add up as they do for the Norwegian 
savings banks. This is due to the uneven nature of the dataset. As long as there are differences in 
the number of observations per year they will not add up. The mean is represented by the total 
mean and each year has the average for that particular year.  
 
 Years 
Financial 
Revenue
Financial 
expenses
Net 
Financial 
Revenue
Loan loss 
provisions
Financial 
Margin
Operational 
expenses CIR Total assets
Total 
Portfolio
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999 1.3457 0.2743 1.1086 0.1366 0.9430 0.7614 1.1110 3.5716 7.2988
2000 1.4981 0.2701 1.2394 0.1403 1.1103 0.8631 1.0729 3.3018 5.6618
2001 1.5024 0.3534 1.1490 0.1241 1.0350 0.8378 0.9923 4.0482 7.6767
2002 1.6020 0.2737 1.3284 0.1281 1.2003 0.9718 0.9754 4.8946 7.4601
2003 1.9054 0.2448 1.6606 0.1089 1.5552 1.0333 0.9523 4.8147 8.6114
2004 1.5748 0.2429 1.3432 0.1025 1.2426 0.9126 0.9818 4.9527 7.1333
2005 1.4770 0.2454 1.2420 0.0858 1.1560 0.8727 1.0235 4.6684 6.4222
2006 1.9264 0.3482 1.5869 0.1239 1.4683 1.0850 0.9216 6.5118 7.0124
2007 3.0322 0.6676 2.3821 0.2018 2.1868 1.5984 0.8662 10.9276 11.1680
2008 5.0243 1.1713 3.8972 0.4442 3.4987 2.5698 0.8389 17.4090 19.9536
2009 5.8875 1.2845 4.6326 0.6223 3.9948 3.1925 0.9105 18.5151 21.7229
2010 7.5918 1.4158 6.0232 0.5791 5.4014 3.7927 0.8158 22.5765 24.4580
2011 4.6625 1.1849 3.5820 0.2227 3.4688 2.9645 0.8204 18.1155 19.2287
2012
2013
2014
Mean 2.6257 0.5409 2.1209 0.2107 1.9178 1.4852 0.9428 11.5000 8.6466
Microfinance institutions
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 Years 
Financial 
Revenue
Financial 
expenses
Net 
Financial 
Revenue
Loan loss 
provisions
Financial 
Margin
Operational 
expenses CIR Total assets
Total 
Portfolio
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999 100.00 % 12.48 % 87.52 % 7.18 % 80.38 % 101.52 % 1.1110 325.37 % 300.35 %
2000 100.00 % 25.65 % 74.35 % 10.74 % 67.35 % 103.92 % 1.0729 365.33 % 506.79 %
2001 100.00 % 19.25 % 80.75 % 11.14 % 70.34 % 94.27 % 0.9923 473.26 % 437.68 %
2002 100.00 % 16.86 % 83.14 % 7.16 % 75.56 % 86.69 % 0.9754 483.70 % 384.72 %
2003 100.00 % 14.39 % 85.61 % 9.09 % 76.68 % 98.55 % 0.9523 514.32 % 405.93 %
2004 100.00 % 14.90 % 85.10 % 7.86 % 77.37 % 99.88 % 0.9818 431.81 % 422.20 %
2005 100.00 % 16.96 % 83.04 % 5.90 % 77.33 % 85.30 % 1.0235 490.80 % 415.64 %
2006 100.00 % 17.77 % 82.23 % 7.28 % 75.46 % 79.15 % 0.9216 446.39 % 399.11 %
2007 100.00 % 20.43 % 79.57 % 8.27 % 71.55 % 73.33 % 0.8662 440.56 % 399.72 %
2008 100.00 % 19.63 % 80.37 % 8.30 % 72.85 % 67.76 % 0.8389 372.18 % 342.63 %
2009 100.00 % 20.23 % 79.77 % 10.26 % 70.06 % 72.71 % 0.9105 383.54 % 321.28 %
2010 100.00 % 19.34 % 80.66 % 7.71 % 72.47 % 66.45 % 0.8158 378.26 % 323.88 %
2011 100.00 % 18.39 % 81.61 % 3.79 % 77.79 % 66.99 % 0.8204 418.92 % 337.26 %
2012
2013
2014
Mean 100.00 % 17.80 % 82.20 % 8.05 % 74.52 % 84.80 % 0.9428 445.07 % 395.20 %
 Years 
Financial 
Revenue
Financial 
expenses
Net 
Financial 
Revenue
Loan loss 
provisions
Financial 
Margin
Operational 
expenses CIR Total assets
Total 
Portfolio
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999 33.92 % 4.28 % 29.64 % 2.96 % 26.68 % 15.35 % 1.1110 100.00 % 85.98 %
2000 31.91 % 5.11 % 27.20 % 2.46 % 24.56 % 24.19 % 1.0729 100.00 % 83.02 %
2001 28.78 % 4.43 % 24.35 % 2.02 % 22.75 % 23.56 % 0.9923 100.00 % 83.49 %
2002 29.02 % 3.60 % 25.42 % 1.70 % 23.72 % 20.67 % 0.9754 100.00 % 82.04 %
2003 33.24 % 3.71 % 29.53 % 2.13 % 27.45 % 21.45 % 0.9523 100.00 % 86.16 %
2004 30.56 % 4.26 % 26.31 % 1.94 % 24.39 % 22.81 % 0.9818 100.00 % 88.19 %
2005 29.37 % 4.48 % 24.89 % 1.63 % 23.29 % 21.28 % 1.0235 100.00 % 86.96 %
2006 30.26 % 4.71 % 25.47 % 2.09 % 23.33 % 21.29 % 0.9216 100.00 % 92.08 %
2007 28.80 % 5.11 % 23.55 % 2.03 % 21.51 % 20.38 % 0.8662 100.00 % 97.09 %
2008 31.28 % 5.65 % 25.04 % 2.51 % 23.08 % 20.13 % 0.8389 100.00 % 96.66 %
2009 31.86 % 5.62 % 25.74 % 2.85 % 22.86 % 21.89 % 0.9105 100.00 % 88.56 %
2010 32.57 % 5.48 % 26.52 % 2.18 % 24.04 % 21.57 % 0.8158 100.00 % 90.53 %
2011 31.17 % 4.98 % 25.72 % 1.47 % 24.37 % 19.55 % 0.8204 100.00 % 91.99 %
2012
2013
2014
Mean 30.52 % 4.71 % 25.71 % 2.07 % 23.70 % 21.36 % 0.9428 100.00 % 89.86 %
As a percentage of financial revenues for microfinance institutions
As a percentage of total assets for microfinance institutions
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A9 T-tests 
 
  
T-test statistics
Operational Expenses % Assets 0.0822 * 0.0000 *** 0.0000 ***
Financial Revenue 0.0006 *** 0.0000 *** 0.0000 ***
Financial Expenses 0.0058 *** 0.0000 *** 0.0000 ***
Net Financial Revenue 0.0004 *** 0.0000 *** 0.0000 ***
Loan Loss Provisions 0.3050 0.0002 *** 0.0000 ***
Financial Margin 0.0002 *** 0.0000 *** 0.0000 ***
Operational Expenses 0.0000 *** 0.0000 *** 0.0000 ***
CIR 0.1256 0.5210 0.0000 ***
Total Assets 0.0009 *** 0.0000 *** 0.0000 ***
Total Portfolio 0.0004 *** 0.0000 *** 0.0000 ***
ROA 0.0282 ** 0.0000 *** 0.0619 *
Operational Profit % Revenues 0.0666 * 0.0084 *** 0.0014 ***
OSS 0.1676 0.2377 0.0000 ***
Microfinance 
Institutions
Norwegian 
Savings Banks
MFIs against 
NSB
The first column indicates whether there is a significant statistical difference in the means for the first 
year for MFIs against the last year.
The second column indicates the same as the first, only for Norwegian savings banks rather than 
MFIs
The last column indicates whether there is a significant statistical difference in the means between 
MFIs and Norwegian savings banks.
Statistical significance: * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
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A10 Correlation matrixes 
 
  
Portfolio 
Yield Age Size
Average 
Loan
Personnel 
Productivity
GDP per 
Capita
Village Loan 
(dummy)
Solidarity 
Group 
(dummy)
Portfolio Yield 1
Age -0.2158 1
Size -0.1839 0.3117 1
Average Loan -0.2929 0.0212 0.2052 1
Personnel Productivity -0.0288 0.0775 0.0861 -0.2724 1
GDP per Capita 0.2295 -0.0287 0.072 0.1434 -0.0907 1
Village Loan (dummy) 0.1273 0.1127 -0.0715 -0.1167 0.1872 0.0045 1
Solidarity Group (dummy) 0.1922 -0.1458 -0.2191 -0.1913 0.1948 -0.0953 -0.2517 1
Operational 
Expenses Age
Average 
Loan
Personnel 
Productivity
GDP per 
Capita
Village Loan 
(dummy)
Solidarity 
Group 
(dummy)
Operational Expenses 1
Age -0.1817 1
Average Loan -0.2632 0.0274 1
Personnel Productivity -0.0529 0.0499 -0.3151 1
GDP per Capita 0.0535 -0.0294 0.1767 -0.0955 1
Village Loan (dummy) 0.1898 0.1089 -0.1176 0.2253 -0.0316 1
Solidarity Group (dummy) 0.1868 -0.1454 -0.2154 0.2634 -0.0799 -0.2545 1
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Reflection Note 
Microfinance institutions are seeing high growth in their industry, but faces challenges with 
financial viability and high cost. The Norwegian savings banks have one of the world’s most 
efficient banking systems and have focused on cost-efficiencies over period of 50 years. The 
objective of this thesis has been to research and identify possibilities for microfinance institutions 
to be more efficient by learning from Norwegian savings banks. We employ a large dataset of 473 
microfinance institutions from 77 different countries spanning 14 years and 81 Norwegian savings 
banks spanning 20 years. Additionally, we have studied developments in the Norwegian market, 
different market phases, accounting figures and ratios and other different aspects on the matter to 
try to establish possible factors that are transferable into microfinance.  
We find that both industries increase their efficiencies by statistically reducing operational 
expenses in percent of total assets. Our panel regressions show that age of an MFI affect neither 
operational expenses, nor portfolio yield, which imply that we cannot support our hypothesis that 
age has an effect on operational expenses. Further, we found differences in the financial 
statements and ratios, whereas Norwegian savings banks tended to be more stable while MFI 
converged towards them. Lastly, we found that cooperation between banks and alliances within 
banks are the main actions that have created the low cost structure in Norway. 
The differences seem to naturally reflect the market developments phases and the fact that MFIs 
have a focus on social mission, hence the focus on costs is not prioritized. What microfinance can 
learn from Norwegian savings banks seems not to be straightforward. Technology together with 
cooperation between banks and alliances within banks seems to have led to the largest 
improvements for the Norwegian savings banks’ cost structure with e.g. shared development 
costs. Cooperation and alliances can be an element microfinance can utilize when starting to use 
more and more technology. International networks have not seemed to work, so domestic 
alliances can be more appropriate for MFIs.  
International Trends 
ResponsAbility (2016) publishes a market outlook every year, which focuses on development, 
forecasts and trends. The major international trends for microfinance the next years will be 
technology, and several experts say that technology can transform the microfinance industry. The 
important technological factors are branchless banking, mobile money and credit scoring.  
Branchless banking is delivering financial service without the customers’ physical need to visit 
the local bank branch. Mobil money, or mobile banking, is a service provided by the MFI that 
allows its customers to preform financial transactions by only using a mobile device. Branchless 
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banking and mobile banking can help the microfinance industry tremendously by lowering its 
transactional costs, and reducing the need for employees preforming non-profit activities. This is 
important for microfinance institutions due to their high operational expenses, where wages is a 
large item. The next trend is credit scoring or credit bureaus. They can help reduce the asymmetric 
information, which can lead to reduced default costs, and improve the repayment rate. All these 
technological trends are crucial for microfinance, and can resolve the worries regarding financial 
viability and maybe survival. All these technological features already exist today, and the question 
is how microfinance can implement them in the best possible way? A possible way of 
implementation is cooperation between commercial banks that already utilizes these technological 
features and microfinance institutions. Through this, the commercial bank can show their 
corporate social responsibility, which is important, as people are more concerned about image and 
brand. 
Innovation 
Microfinance in itself has been an innovation as it created new markets and targeted customers 
that other banks had not bothered reaching. The innovations done in microfinance can be 
summarized into five sections, (1) targeting of poor customers, (2) targeting of women, (3) new 
lending technologies, (4) new organizational solutions, and (5) new sources of funding (Mersland 
& Strøm, 2012b). Microfinance is coming of age, and there are a large need for new innovation. 
The international trends explained above can be the new innovations happening in microfinance. 
There are several gaps we want to point out, and one with large importance is credit scoring. 
There are problems with asymmetric information in microfinance, and lenders exploit this by 
procuring loans knowing that they might not able to repay them whereas the banks have no 
payment record or creditworthiness for the borrower. This leads to borrowers taking multiple 
loans for repaying one loan with another loan which creates a circle of dept. By implementing 
credit scoring in microfinance, it could resolve the bad loans, which leads to lower defaults. 
Should credit bureaus be run by the government or by private actors? It is not certainty that this is 
affordable, or achievable, for the government to implement credit bureaus or profitable for private 
actors in the microfinance industry. E.g. In countries like Bangladesh, where there is no system of 
social security numbers or national ID numbers it is difficult to implement credit-scoring systems. 
Another way to implement credit scoring is domestic cooperating between MFIs or alliances, by 
sharing development costs of developing, renting or buying a credit scoring system. If new actors 
start up in the specific country, the new actors can access the credit scoring system by renting 
from the alliance. Additionally, credit scoring could enhanced repayments rates in microfinance. 
A possible way for implementation is cooperation between commercial banks that already utilizes 
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these technological features and microfinance institutions. In this way the commercial bank can 
show their corporate social responsibility, which are important, as people nowadays are more 
concerned about image and brand.  
Responsibility 
Microfinance has the potential of lifting poor people out of poverty and become a well-known 
concept when Muhammad Yunus received the Nobel Peace Prize in 2006. Microfinance is 
coming of age, and with its maturation comes the claims that the industry is abandoning its 
mission to serve the poor. Microfinance has a social responsibility, a mission, to serve the poor, 
but MFIs have been criticized for become too focused on making profits at the expense of 
outreach to the poorer customers. Microfinance institutions have ethical challenges when 
choosing between serving the poor and making profits. Strengthening the responsible 
management practice for microfinance can result in risk mitigation if MFIs are developed to be 
sustainable making them keep their social responsibility. This means, not dropping the very poor 
in favour of the less poor, in order to achieve higher profit as a result of abandoning their current 
customers. It is not straightforward what action MFIs can do, but the commercial banks can show 
their corporate social responsibility by helping the MFIs. Commercial banks have the technology 
microfinance needs to lower their interest rate, and to make it more affordable to take loans from 
MFIs.  
